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Abstract 
This study examines a range of crossborder infrastructure development issues related to the 
Asian countries. Despite active pursuit of private investment in infrastructure by most 
developing countries in Asia and a growing number of success stories, the pace of such 
investment remains slow. Participation by the private sector in infrastructure development 
has been mixed. While there has been  moderate progress in national infrastructure 
development by the private sector, progress is rather limited in the case of development of 
crossborder infrastructure in Asia. This study documents that Asian countries have attracted 
higher private sector investment for the development of national infrastructure projects such 
as seaports and airports as compared to crossborder infrastructure projects. The rising trend 
among  private investors in infrastructure projects indicates a decline of investments by 
developed country investors. One of the findings of this study is that crossborder energy 
projects have received greater private sector investment globally as compared to transport, 
telecommunication, and water projects. In the context of Asia, too, energy sector projects still 
dominate the investment scenario. By considering all modes of financing, this study finds 
that crossborder infrastructure financing in Asia has witnessed an upward trend in the last 
decade and a half. Aside from hydropower projects in Bhutan, crossborder infrastructure in 
Asia is pursued through public-private partnerships. Interestingly, these few crossborder 
projects in Asia have limited private sector investors, compared to other regions, despite a 
wide base of local investors in Asia. This paper also shows that public sector investment 
drives  crossborder  energy and transportation projects in Asia, whereas private sector 
investments have picked up the pace only recently, specifically after the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis. This study recommends that given the huge infrastructure investment needs of the 
region and insufficient government resources, the role of the private sector and public-
private partnerships in enhancing infrastructure facilities in Asia is very crucial. A review of 
select  case studies of crossborder  infrastructure projects clearly indicates that the major 
reasons for slow progress of regional infrastructure development by private sector stem from 
both  economic to non-economic issues  that  need to be addressed in order to promote 
seamless Asia. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION   
Infrastructure has always played  a  key role in integrating economies across a region.   
Notwithstanding  certain  environmental  side  effects, well-developed and efficient 
infrastructure facilities are essential for regional economic development and growth. Seen as 
part of  a dynamic concept, infrastructure is a  regional public good,  moving factors of 
production within and across regions, thus helping those regions attain higher productivity 
and growth.  
In a regional setting, infrastructure comprises  national and international components. 
Infrastructure that is created and used exclusively for a nation can be termed as national 
infrastructure, while infrastructure that has crossborder implications
1 is popularly termed as 
international infrastructure (hereinafter, crossborder  infrastructure).  While national 
infrastructure  can  indirectly  enhance  regional or international connectivity,  crossborder 
infrastructure enhances international (and regional) connectivity through the  exchange of 
factors of production, trade and investment. For example, transport networks  linking 
neighboring countries enlarge market size, and help national economies to grow. Thus, 
crossborder infrastructure is seen as one of the major determinants of economic integration 
processes, especially for land-locked or island countries (Venables 2007). It is often argued 
that if countries in a region are not interlinked through efficient crossborder infrastructure 
facilities, their integration process will undoubtedly slow down (Vickerman 2002).
2
Asia’s economic performance in the  past few years—particularly in the first half of the 
ongoing decade—has been commendable on many counts. Economic growth has 
accelerated and is now averaging over 7% per annum.
  
3
Asia needs substantial investment in infrastructure varying between US$165–412 billion 
(6.2%–7.3% of GDP) per annum for the period 2007–2011.
 
 A fascinating story is unfolding and 
the entire world is watching with wonder the emergence of Asia as a major economic force. 
Accompanying this growth is the need for efficient national and international infrastructure 
services for both production and consumption, and international trade purposes.  
4
•  High investment costs.  For countries to  integrate  networks  seamlessly, 
expensive programs of shared support and investments are required  so as to 
benefit from crossborder infrastructure.  
 Asia’s long-term growth and 
integration hinges upon the quality and quantity of infrastructure services, both national and 
international, to be developed in years to come. The widening infrastructure gap between 
countries is resulting in lower productivity, high transportation and logistics costs, reduced 
competitiveness, and slower growth. Bridging this gap means overcoming several formidable 
challenges; some of them, as noted by ADB (2006a), are as follows:  
•  Uneven distribution of benefits. The costs and benefits of regional projects are 
likely to be distributed unevenly between countries. This often leads to decisions 
being based on national costs and benefits rather than regional benefits, resulting 
in insufficient provisions for crossborder infrastructure.  
                                                 
1 For example, an international airport or seaport which enhances regional or international connectivity.   
2 A vast literature exists on impact of infrastructure on regional integration. One can refer, for example, Brooks 
and Menon (2008), and ADB-JBIC-WB (2005), among others. 
3 This refers average annual growth rate for the period 2000 to 2006 for ASEAN+4 countries, calculated based on 
World Development Indicators 2008, World Bank.  
4 A vast literature exists on estimation of infrastructure investment needs in Asia in recent years. One can refer, 
Fay and Yepes (2003), Chatterton and Pureto (2005), ADB-JBIC-WB (2005), ESCAP (2006), RIS (2007), to 
mention a few.  ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
 
  2 
•  Financing constraints. The public sector is often unable to provide infrastructure 
because of its weak financial sector, usually marked by underdeveloped long-term 
capital markets and recurring fiscal concerns. International markets also remain 
inaccessible to varying degrees because of the higher rates of return that markets 
expect from such risks associated with investments in the public sector.  
•  Varying regulatory response. The varying strengths and weakness of regulatory 
regimes between countries make regional infrastructure projects difficult to 
coordinate and develop, particularly in securing private sector financing that 
requires strong regulation to mitigate risks.  
We look ahead at what the challenges are for crossborder infrastructure in Asia, and how to 
think of approaching them.
5 Given the above, the objective of this paper is two-fold. First, it 
aims  to identify the trends among  national and regional investors financing crossborder 
infrastructure  projects (CBIP) that can enhance regional connectivity. Second, it  draws 
lessons from case studies and experiences to enhance regional cooperation in Asia. As a 
corollary, it also addresses the major constraints for infrastructure financing (including public 
and mixed investment, as well as private investment) in selected crossborder infrastructure 
projects in Asia.
6
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses trends in crossborder infrastructure 
projects across the world by region and sector. This section deals with private sector 
investments in crossborder infrastructure, and the nature and types of investments driven by 
the private sector. Section 3 focuses on trends in crossborder transportation and energy 
infrastructure in Asia through different modes of financing. One of the reasons for selecting 
crossborder transportation and energy projects is that energy sector projects are driven by 
market demand and are better suited for principal commercial investment while transport 
projects usually have to be justified on the broader economic benefits (beyond commercial 
benefits). Discussion on these two types of crossborder projects is immensely important for 
private sector financing. Section 4 then presents selected case studies of CBIPs in Asia and 
evaluates their results. Section 5 presents the crossborder  infrastructure development 
strategy in South America. Finally, Section 6  presents  policy recommendations for 
enhancing Asian regional connectivity through CBIPs. 
  
2.  TRENDS IN PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENTS IN 
CROSSBORDER  
2.1  Infrastructure Projects 
The last decade and a half witnessed a sharp decline in official development aid for 
infrastructure projects in developing Asia (Kirkpatrick and Parker 2004; Jones 2006). In 
contrast, private capital flows for infrastructure have increased significantly in the same 
period in response to the general trend towards privatization of infrastructure in developing 
countries.  
From  1984 to 2006, private sector investment (PSI) for global  national and crossborder 
infrastructure projects amounted to US$1.1 trillion (Table 1). The  Latin America and 
Caribbean region (LAC) ranked first, accounting for  a  40%  (US$443.22 billion) share of 
global PSI (Figure 1(a)). The Asia and Pacific (AP) and Europe and Central Asia (ECA) 
regions followed with investments of US$343.63 billion (31%) and US$206.48 billion (19%), 
respectively.  
                                                 
5 This has been argued by ADB in many of their seminal publications and RCI activities. Refer, for example, ADB 
(2006b).  
6 While dealing with crossborder infrastructure projects, we follow the definition of crossborder infrastructure, 
provided by ADB/ADBI (reproduced in Appendix 1).  ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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The upsurge in investment in infrastructure has been driven mainly by telecommunications 
(US$536.30 billion). However, investment varies across regions. For example, PSI in the AP 
region  has been  driven by the energy sector (US$127.69 billion), whereas it is 
telecommunications that has attracted majority of the PSI in the other regions.  
Although private sector investment in both national and crossborder  infrastructure has 
increased in the last decade and a half, its growth has been uneven and has fluctuated 
across regions. Global PSI was higher in the 1990s, compared to first half of the ongoing 
decade (Figure 2), a trend that was much influenced by the AP and LAC regions. In contrast, 
the ECA, Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) regions have 
attracted higher PSIs in infrastructure development during 2001–2006  as  compared to 
1991–2000. Nevertheless, the trend in PSI in infrastructure development across regions has 
been rising, except for ECA, where the trend has decelerated in recent years.
7












    (US$ billion)  (%) 
Energy  East Asia and Pacific  98.36  1.25  1.28 
Europe and Central Asia  43.76  1.70  3.88 
Latin America and Caribbean  133.39  5.05  3.79 
Middle East and North Africa  17.47  2.30  13.16 
South Asia  29.34  0.00  0.00 
Sub-Saharan Africa  7.65  1.79  23.40 
Total  329.97  12.09  3.67 
Transport  East Asia and Pacific  69.98  0.00  0.00 
Europe and Central Asia  14.91  0.00  0.00 
Latin America and Caribbean  76.18  0.03  0.04 
Middle East and North Africa  3.00  0.00  0.00 
South Asia  13.82  0.00  0.00 
Sub-Saharan Africa  10.04  0.95  9.45 
Total  187.94  0.98  0.52 
Telecommunication
s 
East Asia and Pacific  61.91  0.00  0.00 
Europe and Central Asia  142.50  0.00  0.00 
Latin America and Caribbean  218.57  0.00  0.00 
Middle East and North Africa  31.03  0.00  0.00 
South Asia  50.25  0.00  0.00 
Sub-Saharan Africa  32.04  0.00  0.00 
Total  536.30  0.00  0.00 
Water  East Asia and Pacific  19.72  0.00  0.00 
Europe and Central Asia  5.30  0.00  0.00 
Latin America and Caribbean  15.08  0.00  0.00 
Middle East and North Africa  1.08  0.00  0.00 
South Asia  0.26  0.00  0.00 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.26  0.00  0.00 
Total  41.69  0.00  0.00 
  Grand total  1,095.90  13.08  1.19 
Notes: *Investment refers cumulative investments for the period 1984–2006 in US$ billion. **In terms of total PSI.  
Source: Calculated based on World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure database, available 
at http://ppi.worldbank.org  
                                                 
7 See, Appendix 2 (a) which provides the year-wise trend in PSI and Appendix 2(b) the same by regions.   ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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Compared to investments in infrastructure overall, however, PSI in crossborder infrastructure 
has been very low. From 1991 to 2006, only 1.36% of cumulative investment in infrastructure 
(US$13.08 billion) went into crossborder infrastructure, mainly in energy and transport (Table 
1). The distribution of cumulative PSI in crossborder infrastructure across sectors has also 
been unbalanced. As shown in Table 1, energy alone has attracted 92.43%  of total 
crossborder investments from the private sector (US$12.09 billion). Private participation in 
energy has increased presumably as a result of technological developments that have 
reduced the minimum size for  efficient power plants, along with  user-friendly financing 
mechanisms that have reduced the risks associated with the projects.  
The annual investment for development of crossborder  infrastructure has also been 
inconsistent across the world. It reached a peak of US$3.75 billion in 1998, and thereafter 
shrunk  to less than US$500 million  in 2006 (Figure 3). Cumulative PSI in crossborder 
infrastructure was almost double during the 1990s (US$9.13 billion), when compared with 
the first half of the ongoing decade (US$3.95 billion).
8


























AP = Asia and Pacific, ECA = Europe and Central Asia, LAC = Latin America and Caribbean, MENA = Middle East 
and North Africa, SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa 
Source of Figure 1(a, b): Calculated based on World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure database, available 
at http://ppi.worldbank.org  
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1990-2000 157.46 82.28 239.03 17.60 11.81 508.18
2001-2006 145.65 118.46 119.39 33.16 37.25 453.92
AP ECA LAC MENA SSA World
 
AP = Asia and Pacific, ECA = Europe and Central Asia, LAC = Latin America and Caribbean, MENA = Middle East 
and North Africa, SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa 
Source: Calculated based on World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Database, available at 
http://ppi.worldbank.org  





























































































Source: Calculated based on World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure database, available at 
http://ppi.worldbank.org  
The  LAC region has been relatively successful in attracting as much as 38%  (US$5.08 
billion) of global  crossborder  infrastructure investment for the period 1984–2007 (Figure 
1(b)).
9
                                                 
9 Refer Appendix 3 (a, b) which provides region-wise crossborder infrastructure. 
 With US$2.74 billion of investment, the SSA region comes next, where PSI in energy 
and transportation have been comparatively balanced. In contrast, PSI in the AP region has 
been very low with only 13% (US$1.25 billion) of total crossborder investment by the private 
sector, thus showing the region’s challenges with respect to CBIPs.  ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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Table 2: Private Sector Investment in Crossborder Infrastructure  
by Sector and Region: 1984–2007 
Sector 
 
AP  ECA  LAC  MENA  SSA  Total 
(US$ million) 
Natural 
Gas  719.00  1,700.00  4,370.00  2,300.00  1,790.00  10,879.00 
Electricity  535.50  0.00  1,530.00  0.00  0.00  2,065.50 
Railroads  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  522.70  522.70 
Roads  0.00  0.00  32.00  0.00  426.00  458.00 
Total  1,254.50  1,700.00  5,932.00  2,300.00  2,738.70  13,925.20 
AP = Asia and Pacific, ECA = Europe and Central Asia, LAC = Latin America and Caribbean, MENA = Middle East 
and North Africa, SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa 
Note: Investment refers to cumulative investments for the period 1984–2007 in US$ million.  
Source: Calculated based on World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure database, available at 
http://ppi.worldbank.org  
Projects related to natural gas (plant and transmission) have attracted nearly US$10.88 
billion of investment (Table 2), indicating that crossborder  infrastructure projects in the 
private domain are mostly driven by energy sector. With US$2.07 billion of private sector 
investments, electricity comes next. In terms of ranking, the AP region appears last in the 
league, where PSI has been restricted only to crossborder  natural gas and electricity 
projects. It is seen that natural gas and electricity projects have the advantage of better 
revenue-generating potential in comparison to transport sector projects. Power projects that 
are driven by market demand thus have low revenue-generating risks, while transport 
projects have to be justified in economic terms and have higher revenue risks.  
Private infrastructure projects have taken a number of forms, i.e., management and lease 
contracts,  concessions, greenfield projects,  and divestitures, of which greenfield projects 
have gained most  in  popularity.
10
Table 3(a): Types of Crossborder Private Sector Investment 
 Greenfield  crossborder  projects have been largely 
developed in the energy sector (Table 3(a)), whereas concession remains  the preferred 
mode for crossborder PSI in the transportation sector. The build, own, and operate (BOO) 
format has been the most preferred project structure for  energy  PSI  (54.6%), whereas 
miscellaneous arrangements, such as rehabilitate, operate, and transfer; or build, 
rehabilitate, operate, and transfer; or rehabilitate, lease or rent, and transfer, accounted for 
96.7% of transport PSI (Table 4(b)). Much of the private investment in electricity has been in 
greenfield projects with independent power producers implementing BOO or build, operate, 
transfer (BOT) contracts. About 28.9% and 16.54% of cumulative investments in the energy 
sector has been invested in crossborder projects implemented under BOO and Merchant 
categories. Unlike SSA,  the  AP  region has witnessed a dissimilar trend in types of 
investment. During 1991–2006, greenfield projects, with an investment of US$1.25 billion, 
accounted for all the private sector investments in the AP region, of which public-private 
partnerships (PPP) were implemented under BOT or BOO routes.  
 
Energy  Transport 
(US$ million) 
Greenfield  12,094.50  32.00 
Concession  0.00  948.70 
Total  12,094.50  980.70 
                                                 
10 A greenfield project allows a private entity or a public-private joint venture builds and operates a 
new facility for the period specified in the project contract. The facility may return to the public sector 
at the end of the contract period, or may remain in private ownership ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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Table 3(b): Project Structures of Crossborder Private Sector Investment 
 
Energy  Transport 
Investment  Share  Investment  Share 
(US$ 
million)  (%)  (US$ million)  (%) 
BOT  3,495.50  28.90  32.00  3.26 
BOO  6,599.00  54.56  0.00  0.00 
Merchant  2,000.00  16.54  0.00  0.00 
Misc.*  0.00  0.00  948.70  96.74 
Total  12,094.50  100.00  980.70  100.00 
Note: *Rehabilitate, operate, and transfer, or build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer, or rehabilitate, lease or rent, 
and transfer 
Source: Calculated based on World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure database, available at 
http://ppi.worldbank.org  
Finally,  the AP  region has attracted about 31%  of  global  PSI (US$343.63 billion) in 
infrastructure, next to Latin America, where the crossborder component has been only 0.5%, 
amounting to US$1.25 billion. Given this low volume of private investment in crossborder 
infrastructure projects, the AP region ranked last among the five regions considered in this 
study.  
3.  TRENDS IN PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT IN 
CROSSBORDER  
3.1  Infrastructure Projects in Asia 
An essential requirement for regional cooperation and sustainable development is the 
provision of efficient, reliable, and affordable crossborder infrastructure services, such as 
power, transport, and telecommunications. Private participation in infrastructure is no longer 
a business dominated by investors from  the  developed world. Firms from developing 
countries mobilized 44% of private funds for projects reaching financial closure in 1998–
2006 (Shurm et al 2008).
11
Given the rapid growth of regional economic activities, trade, and investment in Asia, 
crossborder infrastructure has become an important building block of regional integration in 
the era of globalization (Kuroda et al.  2007). In Asia, development of crossborder 
infrastructure, especially transportation networks and energy pipelines, is underway, and is 
expected to contribute significantly to regional integration by reducing transportation costs 
and facilitating intra-regional trade and services.  
 At the same time, a large number of developing countries have 
introduced some private participation into their crossborder infrastructure services, especially 
telecommunications, and, to a lesser degree, electricity and transportation. 
There are  many causes  behind the  recent surge in private investment in infrastructure. 
Among the most important are the inefficiencies of public service provision, the need for 
economic pricing and cost recovery, technological advances enabling greater private 
participation, advances in regulatory frameworks, the need for private resources, and the 
potential investment gap that countries face. Therefore, the role of the  private sector in 
financing and supporting crossborder infrastructure facilities is paramount. However, given 
the growing demand for national and international infrastructure in Asia, the private sector, 
whether via PSI or PPP, is expected to play a much greater role in bridging the infrastructure 
gap and for sustaining economic growth in the region. Here, we discuss the trends in private 
                                                 
11 There were also changes in the list of the 10 most active sponsors (ranked by investment). Only 3 
of the top 10 sponsors in 1990–2000 were still among the top 10 in 2001–2006, and 4 of the top 10 
were developing country investors (de Mästle and Izaguirre 2008).  ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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sector investment  in both national
12
3.2  Private Investors in International Airports and Seaports in Asia 
 and  crossborder  infrastructure projects, which offer 
direct and indirect implications for the Asian integration process.  
Ideally, international airports and seaports offer crossborder services. About 33% of total 
private sector investment in transportation infrastructure from 1991 to 2006, amounting to 
US$25.37 billion, went into seaports and airports in Asia. There is a positive correlation 
between  the  size of an economy and the private sector investment it has attracted for 
national infrastructure that has  crossborder  implications. Larger  economies  such as  the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India attracted higher PSI for airports and seaports 
from 1991 to 2006 than did smaller economies (Figure 4). The PRC has attracted US$12.41 
billion of private investment in airports and seaports, accounting for 34.44% of total PSI in 
transport infrastructure in the last decade and a half in that country. India and Malaysia trail 
the PRC with investments of US$6.02 billion and US$2.82 billion in airports and seaports, 
respectively (Table 5). Unlike the PRC and India, Malaysia’s share of PSI in seaports and 
airports,  as a percentage of  total PSI in transport infrastructure, has been relatively low 
(17.72%). Private sector investment in airports and seaports in other Asian countries, such 
as Viet Nam, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, has been very low. Whatever PSI went into 
the    transportation infrastructure in these countries is driven by international airports or 
seaports only. 
There has been some replacement of developed country investors by local investors in Asia. 
The US$25.37 billion PSI in airports and seaports in Asia from 1991 to 2006 drew from 
several private sector investors  that were  concentrated in Asia (Figure 5(a, b)).
13
                                                 
12 We only consider national infrastructure which has crossborder implications.  
 If we 
exclude downstream investors, Malaysia ranked first with 15 private sector investors in 
airports and seaports. A few airports and seaports in Asia have also been funded by 
investors from the rest of the world. However, their presence is much smaller compared to 
Asian investors.  
13 See Appendix 4 for list of private sector investors in airports and seaports in Asia. This does not consider 
private sector investors in downstream.  ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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Figure 4: Relationship between Size of the Economy and  




y = 0.0056x + 0.3514

















Notes: *Figures in parentheses are t-values. The t-value of estimated gross domestic product (GDP) coefficient is 
significant at 1% level. **Both GDP and private sector investment (PSI) are taken at current US$ billion.  
Sources: GDP taken from World Bank World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2007, while PSI was estimated from 
the World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure database, available at http://ppi.worldbank.org 




Transport  Airports and Seaports# 
Investment  Investment  Share+ 
(US$ billion)  (%) 
Cambodia  0.45  0.43  97.04 
The PRC  36.03  12.41  34.44 
India  12.84  6.02  46.89 
Indonesia  4.11  1.30  31.61 
Malaysia  15.90  2.82  17.72 
Myanmar  0.05  0.05  100.00 
Pakistan  0.74  0.74  100.00 
Philippines  2.21  0.60  26.89 
Sri Lanka  0.24  0.24  100.00 
Thailand  4.43  0.65  14.77 
Viet Nam  0.12  0.12  100.00 
Total  77.11  25.37  32.90 
PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Notes: *Cumulative investment for the period 1991 to 2006. #Consider only international seaports and airports. +In 
terms of investment in transport sector. 
Source: Calculated based on World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure database, available at 
http://ppi.worldbank.org ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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Figure 5: Private Sector Investors in Airports and Seaports in Asia* 
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Note: * This series considers investors for cumulative investment for the period 1991 to 2006 in international seaports 
and airports.  
Source: Calculated based on World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure database, available at 
http://ppi.worldbank.org  
3.3  Private Investors in Energy Crossborder Infrastructure in Asia 
According to the World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database, Asia 
attracted  about  US$121.3 billion PSI in energy from  1991 to 2006. This was essentially 
driven by larger economies like the PRC (US$34.85 billion), India (US$17.99 billion), and 
Malaysia (US$14.31 billion). As shown in Table 5, about 1% of total energy PSI (US$1.26 
billion) in Asia went into crossborder infrastructure. Regarding CBIPs in Asia, Bhutan and the 
Laotian People’s Democratic Republic  (Lao PDR)  have attracted private investors in 
hydropower, while Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore have attracted 
private investors (and also public sector investors and government) in natural gas 
transmission. Table 6 provides a list of private sector investors in a few completed CBIPs in 
the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). The two prominent hydropower projects, namely, 
Houay Ho Hydro Power and Theun Hinboun Hydro Power, were developed in Lao PDR in 
the last decade as greenfield build, own, operate,  and transfer (BOOT)  projects, where 
almost 95% of generated power is exported to neighboring Thailand. The two Myanmar–
Thailand natural gas transmission projects, namely, Yadana Gas and Yetagun Gas, were set ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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up in Myanmar in the last decade for exporting natural gas to Thailand. All four projects have 
been operating successfully. The number of private investors in these four projects in GMS 
has so far been limited to 10, where these investments were also accompanied by five public 
sector investors as minor shareholders (Table 6). These GMS crossborder  infrastructure 
projects have attracted investments from Nippon Oil of Japan, PETRONAS of Malaysia, 
Total SA and SUEZ of France, and Unocal of USA, among others.  




Energy  Crossborder Energy 
Investment   Investment  Share# 
US$ billion  US$ billion  % 
Afghanistan  0.002  0.000  0.000 
Bangladesh  1.056  0.000  0.000 
Cambodia  0.231  0.000  0.000 
The PRC  34.847  0.000  0.000 
India  17.978  0.000  0.000 
Indonesia  11.680  0.000  0.000 
Lao PDR  2.586  0.536  21.00 
Malaysia  14.313  0.000  0.000 
Myanmar  0.719  0.719  100.00 
Nepal  0.269  0.000  0.000 
Pakistan  6.738  0.000  0.000 
Philippines  15.463  0.000  0.000 
Sri Lanka  0.463  0.000  0.000 
Thailand  12.244  0.000  0.000 
Viet Nam  2.715  0.000  0.000 
Total  121.304  1.255  1.035 
PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Notes: *Cumulative investment for the period 1991 to 2006. #In terms of investment in energy sector 
Source: Calculated based on World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure database, available at 
http://ppi.worldbank.org 
One should also remember that while investors from developed countries (mostly non-Asian 
in origin) are the main sponsors of an increasing percentage of projects, they have still been 
declining over recent years in terms of the absolute number and value of projects in which 
they have participated. In contrast, decline in investment by developed country investors has 
been replaced to a marginal extent by Asian investors. Thus, investors from Asian countries 
are now more willing to play a larger role in infrastructure projects. ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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Houay Ho Hydro 
Power   Lao PDR  220.00 
Greenfield 
project  BOT 
SUEZ Energy, France; 







MW)  1996 
Theun Hinboun 
Hydro Power   Lao PDR  315.50 
Greenfield 
project  BOT 
GMS Power, Thai; 
Nordic Power, Sweden; 
Statkraft, Norway; 
Vattenfall, Sweden; EdL, 






(412 km)  1995 
Yadana Gas** 
Pipeline  Myanmar  394.00 
Greenfield 
project  BOO 
Total SA, France; 







(277 km)  1997 
Yetagun Gas** 
Pipeline  Myanmar  325.00 
Greenfield 
project  BOO 
Nippon Oil, Japan; 
PETRONAS, Malaysia; 
PTT, Thailand; MOGE, 
Myanmar. 
Total          1,254.00       
Notes: *Cumulative investments **Cost for laying pipelines only 
Sources: 1. Calculated based on World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure database, available at http://ppi.worldbank.org. 2. ADB GMS Projects Outline, ADB, available at 
http://www.adb.org/GMS  
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3.4  Asian Crossborder Infrastructure Projects by all Modes of 
Financing  
The analysis above considered only private sector investments in national and crossborder 
infrastructure. However, figures for investment in crossborder infrastructure increase if other 
forms of investment, such as government, PPP and mixed, are also considered.  
Crossborder  infrastructure financing (all modes) has seen an upward trend in the last 
decade and a half in Asia. As shown in Table 7, there are six crossborder  hydropower 
projects, of which five are already commissioned and one is under construction; eight 
crossborder natural gas transmission projects, all in Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN); three crossborder  overland transportation projects, all  in GMS (under 
construction); and one sea bridge connecting Malaysia with Singapore. All these projects 
have attracted about US$13 billion over time, mostly financed through PPP.  


























PPP = public private partnerships. 
Source: Calculated based on Table 7. 
Investment in crossborder infrastructure shows a wide variation across subregions in Asia. 
For example, while transport crossborder infrastructure and gas pipelines are concentrated 
in GMS and ASEAN respectively, the rest of Asia has yet to witness any major development 
in crossborder infrastructure, save for a few energy projects between India and Bhutan. The 
US$13 billion investment in crossborder infrastructure in Asia also indicates three interesting 
features. First, government investment in crossborder  infrastructure is higher than PPP 
investments (Figure 6). Second, to a lesser extent, it may be said that both public and 
private  investment in crossborder  infrastructure in Asia picked  up after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. For example, cumulative investment increased from less than US$500 million 
till 1997 to US$12.52 billion from  1997  to  2007. Third, the growth in investment in 
crossborder infrastructure is mainly driven by the energy sector projects.  ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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Singapore 1998  790.00 
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    Total      12,984.80     
PPP = Public private partnership. 
Notes: *PSP / PPP in downstream including US$62 million power transmission under PPP. **Includes second 
crossing bridge, a Customs, Immigration and Quarantine complex, 3 toll plazas, 2 rest and service areas and other 
ancillary facilities. #Year of operation, except for ongoing projects, for which, we have taken as year of financial 
closure. +Having substantial multilateral funding. 
Data sources: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure database, available at http://ppi.worldbank.org; ADB 
GMS Development Matrix Database, available at http://www.adb.org/GMS/devt-matrix.asp; ASEAN Centre for 
Energy Database, available at http://www.aseanenergy.org; and Ministry of Power, Government of India, available at 
http://www.powermin.nic.in ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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In view of all the foregoing, it may be concluded that crossborder infrastructure financing has 
witnessed an upward trend in the last decade and a half  in Asia. Barring hydropower 
projects in Bhutan, crossborder  infrastructure in Asia is normally pursued through PPP, 
where energy sector projects are relatively higher  in numbers. Interestingly, these few 
crossborder projects in Asia have limited presence of private sector investors, compared to 
other regions. Nonetheless, Asian countries have attracted higher private sector investments 
for development of national infrastructure projects like seaports and airports, compared to 
crossborder infrastructure projects in the past.  
This accumulated anecdotal evidence also suggests that Asian investors have improved their 
position and are taking on a larger share of infrastructure investments that promote regional 
connectivity. There are three possible reasons for this: first, the broadening and deepening of 
capital markets in Asian countries has enabled their investors to mobilize more resources; 
second, the growing experience of investors with infrastructure investments, often as minority 
partners with developed country investors, has given them more expertise; and, third, Asian 
investors might well be in a better position to understand and therefore deal with the political 
economy issues that stem from privately supported Asian infrastructure projects. 
Given the huge infrastructure investment needs of the Asian region and insufficient government 
resources, the role of the PSI and PPPs in enhancing Asian infrastructure facilities, particularly 
crossborder infrastructure, is thus very important. At the same time, Asia has very many active 
local investors, some of whom have been engaged in CBIPs. We look at the trends of these 
investors in some selected CBIPs next.  
4.  CROSSBORDER INVESTMENT PROJECTS IN ASIA: 
REVIEW OF SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
We cite here a few examples among several of ongoing and/or completed CBIPs in Asia and 
critically evaluate their performance in the context of crossborder infrastructure development 
and regional cooperation.
14
4.1  Theun Hinboun Hydropower, Lao PDR 
 
The Theun Hinboun project (originally known as Nam Theun 1-2) was the first BOOT 
Hydropower project implemented in Lao PDR. Construction started in 1994 and the plant 
was made operational in 1998. The 210 MW (2x105 MW) project is located about 100 km 
upstream of the confluence of the Mekong river. A 230 kV transmission line (86 km long) 
was also constructed to transport electricity from the station to the Thailand border. 
The main objective of the project was to support economic growth in Lao PDR by enhancing 
foreign exchange earnings through the export of electric power to Thailand. This was the first 
project implemented under the 1993 memorandum of understanding between Lao PDR and 
Thailand for developing 1,500 MW of power in Lao PDR by the year 2000 for export to 
Thailand. It was the first major investment under the new foreign investment policy of Lao 
PDR. In addition to technical assistance for structuring legal agreements for implementation 
of the project, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) also extended loan assistance for the 
project.  
The final project cost, including foreign and local currencies was US$240.3 million. The 
project was completed on time, without delays, and with substantial savings from the original 
estimated cost. 
                                                 
14 We only consider case studies of some successful CBIPs here; a few more are listed in Appendix 6.  ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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4.1.1  Implementation Arrangement 
In 1994, the Government of Lao PDR formed a PPP, named Theun-Hinboun Power 
Company Ltd. (THPC), to plan, design, finance, construct, own, operate, and maintain the 
project, and sell electricity under a long-term contract to the Electricity Generating Authority 
of Thailand (EGAT).  
The Government of Lao PDR was represented by Electricité du Laos (EdL), the state-owned 
power utility, while the private sector was represented by the foreign sponsors MDX Lao 
Public Company Ltd. (MDX) and Nordic Hydropower AB (NH). The MDX is 90%-owned by 
GMS Power Public Company Limited; the remaining 10% is owned by the Crown Property 
Bureau, Thailand. The NH is equally owned by Statkraft A.S. of Norway and Vattenfall AB of 
Sweden. 
From the beginning, since the legal framework in Lao PDR was inadequate for the project to 
be implemented under a  commercial format, the Government of Lao PDR and THPC 
entered into a License Agreement (LA) that authorized THPC to implement the project on a 
BOOT basis for 30 years (from the  start of commercial operation). The LA contained 
provisions on exclusive rights and tax and royalty obligations of THPC. THPC was also 
protected under the LA against any water diversions detrimental to it, except for the 
implementation of the NT2 Project. In return, THPC was required to pay a royalty of 5% of 
gross revenue to the Government. THPC was granted a tax holiday of five years 
commencing with the start of commercial operations up to the end of 2002, after which 
THPC was expected to pay 15% tax on its taxable income. The Lao PDR Government took 
responsibility for environmental and social mitigation; funding for such mitigation measures 
and compensation, however, was to be provided by THPC (limited to US$2.6 million).  
The Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) was executed between EdL and EGAT in June 1996 
with a  validation period of  25 years from the start of commercial operations. The PPA 
provided for an option to renegotiate the tariff after 10 years and was based on the take-or-
pay principle under which EGAT undertakes to purchase 95%  of the project’s available 
energy output. The tariff itself was denominated in dollars, of which 50% was to be payable 
in dollars and 50% in Thai baht at the exchange rate on the execution date of the PPA. In 
the first year of operation, the tariff was negotiated at US$0.0484 per kWh  and  would 
increase thereafter at a fixed rate of 1% per annum.  
4.1.2  Financing Arrangement 
Equity funding of US$110 million was raised by the Government of Lao PDR, through EdL 
(US$66 million), MDX (US$22 million) and NH (US$22 million). On the other hand, debt 
funding worth US$130.3 million was provided by the Government of Lao PDR (US$6.9 
million), commercial banks (US$64.8 million) and through export credit (US$58.6 million).  
Funding towards the Government of Lao PDR’s contribution for the project was channelized 
through grant assistance from Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (US$7.1 
million) and UNDP (US$0.4 million); and loan assistance from ADB (US$57.7 million) and 
Nordic Development Fund (US$7.3 million).  
The ADB loan was extended to the Government of Lao PDR at a 1% interest rate, with 40 
years maturity and a  10-year grace period. The ADB funds were further on-lent by the 
Government of Lao PDR to EdL (US$5.5 million, at 6.21% interest, with 25 years maturity 
and 5 years grace period) and THPC (US$8.5 million, at 10% interest, with 16 years maturity 
and 4 years grace period).  
4.1.3  Financial Returns  
According to ADB (2000), THPC’s financial performance was found to be exceptional. The 
project was rated as highly profitable with substantial accumulated  net profits during 
operating years. The analysis showed that during the period 1998–2009, total revenues and ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
 
17 
net income from the project would reach US$736.6 million and US$407.6 million, 
respectively. After paying dividends to shareholders, THPC would still retain US$13.8 million 
in unappropriated earnings. On the other hand, the shareholders are projected to recover 
their investment through dividend payments. By 2009, virtually all debt will have been paid 
and profitability will depend on tariff negotiations with EGAT and whether EGAT moves to a 
pooling system. Financial analysis shows that THPC’s recalculated financial international 
rate of return (FIRR) was 19.5% (project life of 25 years). Further, it was found that over the 
period 1998–2000, EdL would earn about US$46.4 million and the income was projected to 
reach about US$28.6 million per annum till the year 2022.  
A recent ADB publication (ADB 2007) has mentioned that THPC’s sales revenues increased 
from US$42 million in 1998 to US$57 million in 2005, and are expected to reach about 
US$55 million in the future. THPC is making a healthy profit and maintains a comfortable 
debt-servicing capacity. The project generated net income of US$88 million from 2003 to 
2005. THPC’s dividend payments over 2003–2005 amounted to US$78 million, of which 
US$47 million went to EdL. In addition THPC paid about US$2.8 million in royalties to the 
government in 2005. The profit tax payment for 2004 was about US$3.4 million and about 
US$2.9 million for 2005.  
Figure 7: Financing Structure of Theun-Hinboun Project 
 
Source: Authors. 
4.1.4  Mitigation of Project Risks  
The project risks were mitigated to a large extent through a number of initiatives from the 
project sponsors  (UNCTAD 2005).  The Government  of  Lao PDR committed to meet its 
obligations under the 30-year BOOT license, while the ADB waived its usual negative pledge 
covenant. The shareholders gave a completion guarantee to the lenders.  
As shown in Figure 7, an offshore escrow account, managed by a French bank, was set up 
and pledged to the lenders. Funds were distributed, first to meet the O&M costs of THPC, 
then to service the debt to the lenders, followed by royalties to the government, and later, 
dividends to shareholders. O&M costs are managed via a contract awarded every three 
years. In addition, Lao PDR agreed to join the World Bank Group’s Multilateral Investment 
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4.1.5  Project Benefits 
THPC was expected to contribute about US$21.2 million revenue  in the year 2000; that 
would increase to US$40.9 million by the year 2022. In the real sense, the project was found 
to have favorable impact on Lao PDR’s economy through export of electricity to Thailand 
and rural electrification in the surrounding areas. Substantial employment was generated 
during the construction period and in plant operation. The project also resulted in capacity 
building of several workers associated with the project. Further, availability of modern 
education and medical services has resulted in improved living conditions in the area. With 
substantial funds earned from the project, the EdL is in a position to subsidize electricity 
tariffs for the poor population in the country and support its various power projects.  
On the negative side, project-related environment and social impacts were found to be a 
serious issue when flows were diverted to the Nam Hai–Nam Hinboun system. However, the 
risks were largely mitigated with support from ADB in the form of review missions and 
technical assistance. 
Overall, the project was  found to be remarkably successful with respect to financing 
arrangements, project implementation, and coordination between all parties concerned. 
5.  NAM THEUN 2 HYDROPOWER, LAO PDR 
5.1  Location 
The 1,075 MW Nam Theun 2  (NT2)  hydropower project is a trans-basin scheme being 
developed via the diversion of the flow of the Nam Theun river from the Nakai plateau down 
to the Xe Bang Fai river. It comprises 4 x 250 MW units designed for the supply of power to 
Thailand and 2 x 37.5 MW units for Lao PDR domestic power consumption. The project also 
includes a 138 km long 500 kV transmission line from the power station to Thailand border 
near Savannakhet.  
In terms of financing, NT2 is the largest private sector crossborder project, as well as being 
the largest private sector hydropower scheme, in Southeast Asia. Construction was started 
immediately after financial closure in June 2005. The project has been constructed at an 
estimated cost of US$1.45 billion (Table 8). The official handover of the project to the Lao 
PDR Government is planned for June 2010.
15
5.2  Implementation Arrangement 
  
The project is being implemented by Nam Theun 2 Power Company Limited (NTPC), a 
company incorporated under the laws of Lao PDR  and mandated through a BOOT   
concession agreement to build, own, operate, and transfer the project to the Government of 
Lao PDR at the end of the 25-year operation period. 
The shareholders of NTPC comprise EDF International (EDFI), a subsidiary of Electricité de 
France  (35%); Lao Holding State Enterprise (LHSE), a company fully owned by the 
Government of the Lao PDR (25%); Electricity Generating Public Company Limited (EGCO) 
of Thailand (25%); and the Italian-Thai Development Public Company Limited (ITD) of 
Thailand (15%).  
The concession agreement for implementation of NT2 was executed between NTPC and 
Government of Lao PDR in 2002. Under the terms of the 30-year concession agreement, of 
which the operating period is 25 years, NTPC has full responsibility for timely completion of 
project. The main construction activities are contracted under a turnkey contract to EDF. The 
NTPC and Government of Lao PDR have joint responsibility for implementation of 
                                                 
15 Refer to http://www.namtheun2.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=98&Itemid=112. ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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resettlement and social development activities. In case of defaults, termination rights have 
been provided to both parties.  
The PPA was executed between NTPC and EGAT and Electricité de France in 2003. Unlike 
the Theun Hinboun project, the PPA is based on the take-or-pay principle under which 95% 
of the project’s energy would be sold to Thailand for the first 13 years, and later subject to a 
spot market, if operated. The energy tariff has been built on system avoided cost
16
Table 8: Financing Structure of Nam Theun 2 
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Total  945.24  20,190.54  1,450.00  100.0% 
Notes: *Converted at 1US$= THB 40. 
Source: ADB (2007). 
5.3  Financing Arrangement 
Equity contribution of nearly 31% of project cost has been made by the shareholders and 
debt funding of about 69% has been raised from international financial institutions (IFIs), 
commercial banks/lenders. A combination of financial institutions, comprising 5 multilateral, 4 
export credit, 2 bilateral and 16 Thai and international commercial banks, are involved with 
financing of the project.  
The World Bank has provided a  Partial Risk Guarantee loan under International 
Development Association (IDA) (US$42 million), and MIGA has extended a guarantee for 
debt (US$42 million), while ADB has extended a Political Risk guarantee (US$42 million). 
The World Bank has also  provided IDA grant assistance (US$20 million), and  ADB has 
extended loan assistance (US$50 million) and a public sector loan (US$16.1 million) to the 
Government of Lao PDR.  
                                                 
16 System avoided cost is the marginal cost of the same volume of energy that Thailand should have 
acquired or generated by other sources such as fuel, gas and coal taking least cost plan into account. 
Under this principle, the cost of energy generated by a Lao project shall be lower than the Thai 
system avoided cost. Difference between Thai System Avoided Cost and Lao Generation Cost will be 
shared by EGAT and IPP owner. ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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In addition, nine international commercial banks (ANZ, BNP Paribas, BOTM, Calyon, Fortis 
Bank, ING, KBC, SG, and Standard Chartered) and seven Thai commercial banks (Bangkok 
Bank, Bank of Ayudhya, Kasikorn Bank, Krung Thai Bank, Siam City Bank, Siam 
Commercial Bank,  and Thai Military Bank) are providing long-term  loans to NTPC. The 
equity contribution of LHSE (one of the shareholders of NTPC) is financed through loans, 
grants, and other tools by AFD, ADB, European Investment Bank, and the World Bank. 
5.3.1  Mitigation of Project Risks 
Some of the major issues related to private sector participation in crossborder infrastructure 
projects are the political, contractual, and legal risks associated with such projects. As noted 
above, these risks have been appropriately addressed by the international funding agencies. 
The NT2 is a classic case of PPP with limited recourse financing, ably supported by 
international funding agencies, export credit agencies, and multiple commercial lenders. 
Learning from shortcomings from the Theun Hinboun Hydropower project, the NT2 has been 
carefully designed, with adequate planning for economic, environmental, and social 
safeguards that are extensively monitored by internationally recognized and independent 
panels, project lenders, and IFIs. The safeguards were designed in consultation with local 
villagers and under international guidelines and recommendations from the various financial 
institutions involved with the project. These measures are fully funded as part of the project 
cost and cover the entire project area including catchment reservoir and downstream areas. 
As it is based on the take-or-pay principle, revenue risks for the project are minimal. A 5-year 
tax holiday followed by 10% and 15% corporate profit tax during the next 5-year period 
applies to the project. 
5.3.2  Expected Project Benefits 
Given the relatively small size of the national economy, the project is expected to have 
significant economic impacts in Lao PDR.
17
It is expected that the NT2 could lead to doubling in private investments (IMF, 2003) during 
the construction period. Construction activities are providing job opportunities to nearly 4,000 
workers in the neighborhood and local areas. All these effects are expected to boost the 
economic growth of Lao PDR from the current 6% to nearly 7% up to 2011. In addition, 
availability of additional electricity from the power station and better access due to about 140 
km of new or upgraded roads under this project would improve the living condition of the 
population in the adjoining areas.  
 The project will generate considerable revenue 
through taxes, royalties,  and dividends for the government, and this  revenue can be 
effectively ploughed back to provide necessary public goods and services required for 
sustainable growth and poverty reduction. The Government of Lao PDR, via the revenue to 
be generated from the project, is planning to establish a poverty reduction fund with the 
objective to promote economic and social development throughout the country. 
Revenues generated from the project will provide substantial funding for the government’s 
National Growth and Poverty Eradication programs. The NT2 project would help the Lao 
PDR economy grow at higher rate in coming years, which would lead to higher personal 
incomes and per capita consumption, thereby bringing economic well-being and reducing 
poverty in Lao PDR. 
5.4  East–West Economic Corridor in the Greater Mekong 
Subregion 
With an eye toward addressing their mutual development needs, the GMS countries adopted 
a program of economic cooperation with assistance from ADB in 1992. The program was 
                                                 
17 See, for example, ADB (2005a), Macro-economic Impacts of the Nam Theun 2 Project, Manila, February ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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conceived to create an integrated, prosperous, and equitable Mekong subregion, 
complementing individual national efforts to promote economic growth and reduce poverty. 
In 2001, the GMS countries endorsed a 10-year strategic framework targeting enhanced 
connectivity, increased competitiveness, and a greater sense of community in the region. 
About 11 flagship projects were identified, out of which the North-South Economic Corridor 
(NSEC), East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC), and Southern Economic Corridor (SEC) 
dominated the GMS transport sector plan. The corridors were planned to encourage trade, 
investment,  and tourism, and ease crossborder  movement of people and goods in the 
subregion and were intended to serve about 2.6 million sq. km. of surface area and nearly 
320 million people.  
Out of the several flagship programs, the EWEC is in the most advanced  stage of 
completion, and several transport, energy, telecommunications, industrial, tourism, and other 
programs have been successfully launched or are under implementation. Most of these 
projects are being funded through public resources, and private participation is limited. The 
case study of EWEC has been included to appreciate the catalytic role played initially by the 
government and donor agencies in funding basic infrastructure, which, in turn, attracts the 
private sector to develop other economic infrastructure in the subregion.  
The EWEC flagship initiative focuses on transport (road, water, railway,  and airports), 
energy,  telecommunications, tourism, and other initiatives with the intent  to further 
strengthen economic cooperation, and facilitate trade, investment, and development along 
the East–West transport corridor. A pre-investment study for EWEC (ADB, 2001) has 
developed a framework for cooperation and development in agro-industry, infrastructure, 
trade and investment, tourism, and industrial estates, and recommended about 74 projects, 
including policy and institutional development initiatives.  
5.4.1  Completed/Ongoing Infrastructure Projects along EWEC  
Data from ADB’s  GMS Development Matrix  has been used to appreciate the financing 
trends for completed and ongoing infrastructure projects along the EWEC. About 11 
projects, comprising 9 transport and 2 investment projects are either completed or are under 
implementation along the EWEC. Transport projects comprise the improvement of road links 
and construction of missing links along the EW transport corridor, and rehabilitation of port 
facilities at Da Nang, Viet Nam. The investment projects comprise the Lane Xang Mineral 
project in Lao PDR and the feasibility study for Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Savan-Seno 
along the Lao PDR-Thailand border. 
5.4.2  Transport  
The  transport segment of the EWEC  has been implemented with assistance from ADB, 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA), and other donor agencies and national governments. The transport corridor (1,450 
km) starts near the Andaman Sea west of Myanmar and traverses through Thailand and Lao 
PDR before terminating near the  South China Sea  east of Viet Nam. The corridor links 
Mawlamyine–Myawaddy in Myanmar; Mae Sot–Phitsanulok–Mukdahan in Thailand; 
Savannakhet–Dansavanh in Lao PDR; and Lao Bao–Hue–Dong Ha–Da Nang in Viet Nam. 
While most of the highway is now operational, work on few sections in Myanmar is yet to be 
taken up. The highway provides crucial access to ports in northeast Thailand and central 
Lao PDR, and has opened opportunities to several medium-sized cities.  
In the port sector, rehabilitation of the Da Nang port (in Viet Nam), intended to meet the 
region’s increased tourism and trade needs prior to the completion of the EWEC transport 
project, was completed through JBIC (now JICA) loan assistance. A 15 km access road from 
the port to Highway 1 was also constructed.  ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
 
22 






Funding Agencies  Project Outline 
Mawlamyine–Myawaddy 
Highway, Myanmar  100 
Government of 
Thailand’s soft loan to 
Myanmar 
Improvement of Myawaddy to 
Mawlamyine roads in Myanmar 
comprising  (i) Myawaddy–Kawkareik–
Paan–Mawlamyine; and (ii) Myawaddy–
Kawkareik–Mudon–Mawlamyine roads. 
Upgrading of first 18 km section of Mae 
Sot–Myawaddy–Mawlamyine road 
completed with assistance from Thailand.  






Govt. of Thailand – 
¥1,870 million 
Out of the total 770 km, 4-laning of 233km 
has been completed; 75km is under 
construction and 262km to be widened 
over 2007–11 
Construction of missing 





Thailand (funding from 
WB & ADB is under 
consideration) 
Construction of four road sections of 
Eastern Seaboard corridor 
Second Mekong 
International Bridge, 









Rest by individual 
governments 
Construction of Mukdahan–Savannakhet 
Bridge (1.6km) and approach roads (6km) 
Access roads to Second 
Mekong International 
Bridge, Thailand 
22  Government of 
Thailand 
4–laning of RN 212 on Mukdahan side 
and widening of Mukdahan Bypass 
Improvement of Xeno– 
Muang Phin highway, Lao 
PDR 
65  Government of Japan 
(Grant through JICA) 
Project involves 130–km road section 
[Seno–Phalan (70 km) & Phalan–Muang 
Phin (60 km)]  
Improvement of Muang 
Phin–Dansavannh 
highway, Lao PDR 
40 
ADB Loan–US$32 
million, and   
Govt. of Lao PDR– 
US$8 million 
Rehabilitation of RN 9 (78 kms), including 
border crossing infrastructure, 
construction & improvement of rural 
roads, small bridges, river crossing 
systems, and other infrastructure.  
Upgrading & 
Improvement of Dong 




million and   
Government of Viet 
Nam–US$11 million 
Upgrading & improvement of RN 9 
between Lao Bao and Dong Ha on 
Highway 1 (83 km), including upgrading 
of the Dong Ha bypass and border–
crossing infrastructure 
Construction of Dong Ha–
Da Nang – Hai Van 
Tunnel, Viet Nam 
251 
JBIC loan–¥18.9 billion, 
and rest by 
Government of Viet 
Nam 
Construction of two parallel 6.4 km 
tunnels, 5.9 km access roads and bridges 
along Highway 1, connecting Da Nang 
and Hue 
Rehabilitation of Da Nang 
Port at Tien Sa, Viet Nam  124 
JBIC Loan–¥10,690 
million and rest by 
Government of Viet 
Nam 
Upgrading 2 terminals, construction of a 
breakwater, 15 km access road to 
Highway 1.  
ADB = Asian Development Bank, JBIC = Japan Bank for International Cooperation, JICA = Japan International 
Cooperation Agency, WB = World Bank. RN = Route Number 
Note:*Data not available 
Source: ADB website, GMS Development Matrix, 2006. available at http://www.adb.org/GMS/devt-matrix.asp 
                                                 
18 This was the first ODA loan by JBIC for a crossborder  infrastructure development project embracing two 
countries ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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ADB = Asian Development Bank, JBIC = Japan Bank for International Cooperation, JICA = Japan International 
Cooperation Agency. 
Source: ADB GMS site, available at: http://www.adb.org/GMS/Economic-Corridors. 
Transport projects along the EWEC have attracted investments of US$813 million, primarily 
from donor agencies and from public resources of member countries. As noted in Figure 8, 
the JBIC has contributed about 53%, JICA 8%, ADB 7%, and others comprising financing 
from country governments, and other donor agencies, about 32%. Thus, transport projects 
along EWEC have not attracted finances from the private sector. On a few sections, a toll is 
being imposed, and the revenue generated is used to maintain the facility and service the 
debt.  
5.4.3  Trade Facilitation and Crossborder Transport Agreement 
The transport crossborder barriers along the EWEC have gradually decreased since 2000. 
For example, travel time between Khanthabouly (Savannakhet) bordering Thailand to 
Dansavanh bordering Viet Nam has been reduced from 12 hours to as low as 3 hours. 
Further, accessibility to education and medical services has also improved. In 2003, all 
member countries had signed the crossborder  transport agreement (CBTA), and,  with 
completion of the second Mekong bridge in 2006, developed through JBIC assistance, a 
major portion of the EWEC was ready for movement of goods and people.  
Under the crossborder trade and investment flagship, a number of technical assistance (TA) 
programs were extended to the GMS countries. The assistance comprised formulation of the 
CBTA and support to member countries for framing annexes and protocols, institutional 
development and capacity building, laws and regulations improvement, and identification of 
means to mitigate non-physical barriers for crossborder movement. So far, an investment of 
US$5.5 million has been made, with ADB contributing about 74%, country governments 
nearly 22%,  and  the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (ESCAP) about 3%. The procedures are being pilot tested along the Thai–Lao PDR 
border at Mukdahan–Savannakhet and at the Lao PDR–Viet Nam border at Dansavanh–Lao 
Bao and is being prepared for full implementation starting 2009. 
5.4.4  Industrial Investment 
A number of SEZ/industrial zone projects have been developed along the EWEC. 
Completion of the east-west corridor has shown positive impact in Savannakhet, including 
rapid increase in foreign direct investment (FDI). It is reported that total FDI increased from 
US$17.9 million during 1995–2000 to US$207 million during 2001–2005. This has resulted in 
the creation of jobs, which has improved socioeconomic conditions, and reduced poverty 
among people living in the border areas.  ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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The Lao Bao SEZ, spread over 15,800 hectares of land, was the first SEZ developed in Viet 
Nam in 1998. An investment of US$25 million was made in providing basic infrastructure like 
electricity, water, and telecommunications. To attract private investors, preferential treatment 
was provided, including exemption from value-added tax, export/import tax, and special 
consumption tax. Corporate tax was waived for the first four years and discounted thereafter. 
Half of the personal income tax of laborers was waived and land lease was exempted for the 
first 11 years. As a result, about 45 projects with investment of nearly US$120 million were 
made by the year 2006. In addition, a major private sector project (Lane Xang Minerals Ltd.), 
costing US$205 million, has been developed by the Australian gold and copper producer, 
Oxiana, in this area.  
The Savan-Seno SEZ (Lao’s first SEZ) is under implementation and is scheduled for 
completion in 2011. The SEZ was identified by a JICA study, while the cost (US$300,000) 
for preparing the Feasibility Study was provided by the Government of Thailand. The SEZ 
comprises twin sites, one located near the Second Mekong International Bridge (305 
hectares) and the other in Seno at east of Savannakhet (20 hectares). The industrial estates 
will function as export processing zone, free-trade zone, and free service and logistics 
center. To attract investments, preferential treatment is provided, including exemption from 
corporate tax for the first 5–10 years, exemption from import and consumption tax, as well as 
personal income tax discount of 5%. Land lease is allowed for 75 years, comprising free 
lease for the first 12 years if total lease period is more than 30 years. 
Further, with an objective to enhance PPPs and competitiveness, a 10-year fund with target 
capitalization of US$20–25 million has been created. The fund identifies sectors and 
industries for investment in Cambodia, Lao PDR and Viet Nam. ADB has extended 25% of 
the equity capital, while the balance has been contributed by other development financing 
institutions and private investors. The fund provides long-term equity support to small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and invests in enterprises with strong growth potential, 
export orientation, and capable management. It targets enterprises that are able to generate 
employment, promote an environment that fosters economic growth, and forge regional 
cooperation in the GMS.  
5.4.5  Financing for future Projects along East-West Economic Corridor  
The ADB Development Matrix has identified about 356 projects throughout the GMS at an 
estimated cost of US$27.1 billion, out of which transport and energy sectors would comprise 
66% and 28% respectively. 
Forty  projects, at an estimated cost of US$1.44 billion, are proposed along the EWEC. 
Considering that most of the east-west transport link is now functional, future initiatives shall 
be focused towards economic and industrial infrastructure. Accordingly, transport, 
investment,  and energy projects are expected to constitute 59%, 22%,  and 18%  of the 
estimated cost respectively. It should be mentioned that the costs for some major initiatives, 
such as development of  the  western end of the  EWEC and economic activities to be 
established by the private sector, are not included. ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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Figure 9: Estimated Cost for Proposed Projects in Greater Mekong Subregion 
 
Source: Calculated by authors based on GMS database, available at http://www.adb.org/GMS.  
The ADB report on GMS Flagship Initiative EWEC (ADB 2005d) indicates that major sources 
for funding these projects shall comprise government, multilateral development,  and 
international lending agencies, foreign and local direct private investment, international 
private equity funds, and international and domestic capital markets. As mentioned above, 
the participating governments will have to shoulder a significant share of project costs, along 
with policy/program formulation, and implementation, and institutional development. In 
several cases, implementation of projects will require multi-country support, and cost-sharing 
will have to be evolved on a case-by-case basis.  
5.4.6  Government Support 
The EWEC traverses four countries and the road projects can be categorized as CBIP. 
However, all road improvement  projects along the EWEC are funded by national 
governments and/or external donor partners, and private sector participation has been 
negligible. Such transnational roads do not cater for large traffic volumes and are not 
financially viable. These projects are considered as basic infrastructure projects and do not 
attract the private sector  investment. However, once the basic road network is made 
available, other economic activities start gaining momentum and the private sector may later 
participate in ventures that are financially remunerative. Accordingly, leadership from 
national governments in planning and funding such crossborder transport projects and from 
the external funding agencies that support future development is highly important. 
5.4.7  Project Benefits  
To sum up, the GMS economic corridors would link the subregion with a direct outlet for 
trade with the rest of the world. There is no denying that the combination of improved access 
to trade and reduced impediments to crossborder  trade would accelerate the economic 
development of the region, primarily along the corridors. These GMS corridors would 
encourage trade, investment, and tourism in the Mekong region, and ease the crossborder 
movement of people and goods, thereby increasing  subregional economic growth and 
reducing poverty.  
GMS Countries  EWEC ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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5.5  Hydropower Projects in Bhutan 
Hydropower stations in Bhutan can be seen as success stories of crossborder  energy 
projects between two friendly neighboring countries. Bhutan has 26 hydropower stations, out 
of which 4 major hydro plants (Table 10) are crossborder  projects. Since the country’s 
electricity generation is significantly higher than the maximum domestic demand of 130 MW, 
Bhutan is a net exporter. 
5.5.1  Bhutan–India Hydropower Cooperation 
The hydropower cooperation between the two neighboring countries started with the signing 
of the Jaldhaka agreement in 1961. The Jaldhaka hydel is located on the India side of Indo-
Bhutan border in West Bengal. The 27 MW Jaldhaka Hydel Power Station Stage-I was 
commissioned in 1967–1972 and the Stage-II Power House, with an installed capacity of 8 
MW was commissioned in 1983. Most of the power produced at Jaldhaka is exported to 
Southern parts of Bhutan. The benefits of the crossborder energy trade have encouraged 
Bhutan,  which has a hydro potential of over 30,000 MW,  to seek Indian investments in 
setting up power plants. 














Government  Kurichhu (60 MW)  2002  119 
Tala (1020 MW)  2003  812 
Basochhu (64 MW)  1997  220 
Austrian 
Government 
Source: Ministry of Power, Government of India. 
The India–Bhutan partnership in hydropower effectively started in 1978, when India 
extended  US$200 million for construction of a 336 MW hydroelectric plant at Chukha in 
Bhutan. The Chukha hydel project was entirely funded by the Government of India with a 
60:40 ratio of grant and loan. It was successfully commissioned in 1988, and the project was 
handed over to the Bhutanese government in 1991. About 70% of power generated from this 
project is exported to India. India is also helping Bhutan in providing training and human 
resource development in the power sector.  
Apart from Chukha, India has also implemented the Kurichhu and Tala hydropower projects 
in Bhutan. Looking at the financial benefits of crossborder  energy projects, the Royal 
Government of Bhutan has requested India to develop a 1095 MW hydro plant at 
Punatsangchhu.
19
5.5.2  Tala Hydropower and Transmission Project 
  
The Tala Hydroelectric project is the biggest crossborder power project in South Asia. This 
1,020 MW project has been constructed with an investment of around US$1 billion, that is 
entirely funded by the Government of India (GOI) by way of grants and loans at a 60:40 
ratio. Once the project is fully completed, all power from this project will be exported to India. 
The first phase (170 MW) of this project was commissioned in May 2008.
20
                                                 
19 The Indian Prime Minister laid the foundation stone of this plant during his visit to Bhutan in May 2008.  
 This project has 
attracted several public and private sector  investors in construction (mostly Indian 
contractors) such as Bharat Heavy Electrical, Hindustan Construction Company, Larsen and 
Toubro and Jaiprakash Industries.  
20 This plant was officially inaugurated by the King of Bhutan and the Indian Prime Minister, during the visit of the 
Indian Prime Minister to Bhutan in May 2008.  ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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The project has also attracted private sector investment downstream of the development. 
For example, a joint venture company has been formed for transporting power from the 
station to the northern states in India.
21
5.5.3  Proposed PPP in Hydropower 
 The joint venture company (Powerlinks Transmission 
Limited (PTL)) established under the PPP format is jointly owned by Tata Power and the 
Power Grid Corporation of India, a government-owned company. In 2003, ADB extended a 
US$62 million loan for this power transmission project, which is a classic case of multi-lateral 
funding support for private sector power projects in India. The transmission lines were 
developed under a  BOOT basis with a concession period of 30 years;  thereafter the 
ownership will be transferred to the government-owned Power Grid Corporation of India. 
The Bhutan Government has planned the Dagachhu hydropower project (114 MW), which 
aims to export power to India. This project is proposed as a demonstration project to be 
financed by leveraging public and private capital in line with a new policy for private 
participation in hydropower in Bhutan. The hydropower site will be a run-of-the-river type 
with barrages where water will be diverted to the powerhouse, and no major backwater will 
be created (ADB 2007). The project is planned to be implemented under the clean 
development mechanism as defined in the Kyoto Protocol. The Government of Austria has 
supported the feasibility study and preparation of the project design document.  
5.5.4  Challenges and Needs 
Theoretical potential for hydropower in Bhutan is 30,000 MW, with only about 5% tapped so 
far. The hydropower sites are mainly export-oriented and run-of-the-river types. To 
accelerate them on a sustainable basis, Bhutan has to establish a policy and institutional 
framework for private participation such as PPP and independent power producers (IPPs). 
The Bhutan–India example is a classic case of cooperation between two friendly neighboring 
countries under which a power-deficient country is allowed to set up hydropower stations 
under a majority grant and low-interest loan contribution. All power from the station is sold to 
India on a commercial basis, which means the project has negligible risk exposure.  
In order to strengthen hydropower generation, rural electrification, region-wide energy 
efficiency,  and  crossborder  economic cooperation through PPPs, ADB has sanctioned a 
US$1.91 million technical assistance (TA) to Bhutan. The TA is being financed on a grant 
basis by the Japan Special Fund, funded by the Government of Japan. The Government of 
Bhutan is expected to finance US$310,000, equivalent of local currency costs through in-
kind contributions. 
5.6  Malaysia-Singapore Second Link 
This is the second border crossing bridge (also known as ‘Second Crossing’ or ‘Linkedua’) 
between Malaysia and Singapore, and connects Tanjung Kupang/Johor in Malaysia with 
Tuas in Singapore. The bridge was built with an objective to reduce traffic congestion at the 
Johor–Singapore Causeway (the first border crossing between the two countries constructed 
in 1920). On the Malaysian side,  the bridge connects the Second Link Expressway 
(Linkedua Expressway), while, on the Singapore side,  it connects with the Ayer Rajah 
Expressway and the other supporting roads around the Tuas industrial area. 
The 1.92 km twin deck bridge accommodates dual three-lane carriageways. Besides the 
bridge, the project comprises 44 km of expressways, a customs, immigration,  and 
quarantine complex, 3 toll plazas, 2 rest and service areas, and other ancillary facilities. In 
                                                 
21 Specifically, this transmission project involved construction of the transmission lines (1,166 kms.) 
from Siliguri in West Bengal via Bihar to Mandola in Uttar Pradesh. For further details, visit, 
http://www.powerlinkstransmission.com  ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
 
28 
addition, development of a new town in Johor State, Malaysia is also included. The bridge, 
designed to cater to about 200,000 vehicles a day, was opened to traffic in January 1998. 
5.6.1  Project Facilities 
The  crossborder  link provides safe and congestion-free travel, with quick customs and 
immigration clearances. The checkpoint on the Singapore side, the Tuas Checkpoint, has 24 
immigration lanes for light vehicles (cars) and 10 lanes for motorcycles. The corridor is 
equipped with traffic monitoring and surveillance systems that  provide  travel advisories 
through variable message signboards. The rest and service areas provide for restaurants, 
Muslim prayer room, toilets, showers, playground, petrol stations, and public phones. The 
toll plaza provides for manual and semi-automatic system (using smartcards). Cash at the 
toll plaza is accepted in both currencies, however, on a one-for-one basis.   
5.6.2  Implementation Arrangement and Investors 
A concession  agreement  (CA)  was signed in July 1993 with United Engineers Malaysia 
Berhad (UEM) for implementing the project on a BOT basis. The CA gave exclusive rights 
and authority to UEM to design, construct, manage, operate, and maintain the bridge and 
expressways for a period of 30 years. In May 1994, through an agreement, UEM assigned 
all its rights, liabilities, and obligations in respect of the CA to Linkedua Malaysia Berhad– 
LINK, a wholly owned subsidiary of UEM. 
Being a crossborder facility, an intergovernment agreement (IGA) was signed in March 1994 
for defining the responsibilities of both governments with regard to the design, construction, 
operation, and maintenance of the bridge. Further, in September 1994, a Supplemental 
Concession Agreement (SCA) was signed to take into account the IGA between the 
Governments of Malaysia and Singapore. As per the SCA, LINK’s obligation to carry out the 
project and its rights under the CA are consistent with the Malaysian government’s obligation 
under the IGA relating to the works and the rights in connection with the Malaysian side of 
the bridge and the customs complex. A joint committee comprising representatives of each 
government was formed to oversee the project implementation. The award was valued at 
RM1.6 billion plus a S$600 million component from Singaporean investors.  
Project sponsors on the Malaysian side include the Malaysian Highway Authority (LLM), 
Government of Malaysia; PLUS Expressway Berhad; and Linkedua Malaysia Berhad; the 
Land Transport Authority, Government of Singapore, was the sponsor on the Singapore 
side. The project on the  Malaysian side of the bridge is maintained by Malaysia PLUS 
Expressway Berhad and Linkedua Malaysia Berhad, while the Land Transport Authority 
(LTA) of Singapore is responsible for maintaining the project on the Singapore side. 
5.6.3  Project Risks and Mitigation Measures 
Projects of such magnitude require large cash flows during the initial years of operation, 
followed by sustained revenue through user charges to meet the project’s expenses and 
service the debt component. In order to make the project attractive, the financial viability was 
enhanced by providing rights to the concessionaire for developing a new township in 
southwest Johor Darul Ta'zim called Prolink 2020. The township was jointly developed by 
the project company based on a cost-sharing arrangement with Prolink Development (PD), 
also owned by UEM. After completion of the bridge, all rights, liabilities, and obligations 
under these agreements were to be transferred by the project sponsor to PD against a pre-
determined cash payment. 
For road projects of such nature, future growth in traffic is a major risk and can considerably 
affect the project revenues. After it opened in 1998, traffic on the bridge was only about one-
third of the original estimate. As a result, the project company has been continuously facing 
problems in its debt-service payment. Information in  the  public domain reveals that 
cumulative revenue of the concessionaires in the year 2007 was RM27.6 billion, while the ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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total cumulative net profit was RM3.5 billion. In order to ensure financial returns to the 
project developers, the government is planning to pay compensation to toll concessionaires 
in the form of prolonged concessions. 
Recently, after realizing that higher toll rates are a deterrent to road use, the Malaysian  
government is considering revisiting  the concession agreements with the possibility of 
reducing toll rates by balancing toll reduction with O&M cost and payback to financiers. 
Considering the  risks associated with private sector transport projects, the recent 
interventions by the Government of Malaysia can be seen as positive steps in building the 
confidence of the private sector. 
5.7  Indonesia–Singapore Gas Pipelines 
The Indonesia–Singapore gas pipelines are successful cases of crossborder  energy 
projects. Both countries have intensified interaction and cooperation in the energy sector and 
have played a leading role in setting up the “Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline” (TAGP)  that 
envisions the establishment of a transnational pipeline network linking the major natural gas 
producers and consumers in Southeast Asia.
22
In January 1999, the Singaporean consortium SembGas signed an agreement to purchase 
West Natuna natural gas from the Indonesian state energy company Pertamina. Indonesia 
began exporting natural gas in 2001, with the opening of a 400-mile, 325-million cubic feet 
per day (ft
3/day) sub-sea pipeline from West Natuna to Singapore. In August 2003, a second 
natural gas connection to Singapore was opened when the South Sumatra–Singapore 
pipeline was completed. This line reached 350 million ft
3/day maximum capacity during 2006 
and will deliver natural gas to Singapore over a 20-year contract. Another 100 million ft
3/day 
of natural gas is expected to be delivered via the Asamera pipeline from the Conoco Phillips 
field to power Singapore's planned Island Power station;  however, the project has 
experienced numerous delays. 
  
The gas transmission pipeline is operated by Indonesia's PT Perusuhaan Gas Negara 
(PGN). The pipeline cost of US$420 million, was raised in the form of US$112 million in 
loans from the European Investment Bank, US$88 million from ADB and the remainder from 
PGN.  
5.7.1  Emerging Issues 
Natural gas use is rising rapidly, as the Singapore government promotes policies aimed at 
reducing carbon dioxide and sulfur emissions, ensuring energy security, and promoting the 
country as a regional hub for an integrated gas pipeline network. In 2002, the Singapore 
government set a target of 60% of the country's electricity to be generated from natural gas 
by 2012. By 2003, this goal was already achieved, and Singapore’s Energy Market Authority 
(EMA) reports that about 80% of the country’s electricity demand comes from natural gas 
today. However, in November 2003 and June 2004, Singapore experienced power outages 
that were the result of natural gas supply disruptions. After the June 2004 incident, the 
government set up the Energy System Review Committee (ESRC) to study the root causes 
of the gas disruptions and evolve measures to strengthen the energy system’s reliability. 
Among other recommendations, the ESRC called upon Singapore to diversify its sources of 
natural gas, as it has historically relied on Indonesia for its natural gas imports.  
                                                 
22 The TAGP concept was initially proposed in 1997 as part of ASEAN’s “Vision 2020” initiative. In July 2002, 
energy ministers from the ASEAN countries signed a memorandum of understanding to study the viability of 
the project, although much work remains to be completed to fully realize the project’s goals (for more 
information, see ASEAN’s Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation, 2004–2009 ). ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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Figure 10: Existing Crossborder Gas Pipelines in Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations* 
 
Note: *As on March 2008. Boundaries are not necessarily authoritative.  
Source: Chantanakome (2008) and ASEAN Centre for Energy, Jakarta. 
5.8  Myanmar–Thailand Gas Pipelines 
The bulk of gross national hydrocarbon production in Myanmar is accounted for by the 
prolific Yadana and Yetagun offshore fields, which have a combined average output of over 
800 million ft
3/day of gas. About 80% of this yield is piped to Thailand, with the balance 
going to domestic needs, all of which is used for electrical power generation. Myanmar and 
Thailand have two crossborder  gas pipelines (Figure 10), developed through PPP: the 
Yadana (Myanmar)–Ratchaburi (Thailand) pipeline, completed in 1999, and the Yetagun 
(Myanmar)–Ratchaburi (Thailand) pipeline, completed in September 2000.  
5.8.1  Yadana gas pipeline 
The Yadana gas field is located about 60 km offshore to the nearest landfall in Myanmar. 
This major energy resource contains more than 5.3 trillion ft
3 (150 billion m
3) of natural gas, 
with an expected field life of 30 years. Output from the field averaged over 19.3 million 
m
3/day  per day in 2006, where Thailand imports about 700 million ft
3/day. The Yadana 
pipeline is 256 miles (412 km) long, most of which is underwater. Construction of the pipeline 
was completed in 1998 and had a cost of US$1.2 billion, US$394 million of which went to 
laying the pipeline.  
The Yadana project is operated by Total S.A., France, with Unocal Corporation, USA, as its 
junior partner along with PTT, a Thailand-owned oil and gas company, and Myanma Oil and 
Gas Enterprise (MOGE), a state-owned enterprise of Myanmar. The field was developed 
under a conventional production-sharing contract by four investors: ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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•  Total, S.A. (operator): 31.24%  
•  Chevron Corp: 28.26%
23
•  Petroleum Authority of Thailand Exploration & Production (PTT-EP): 25.5%; and   
  
•  Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE): 15% 
A  memorandum of understanding was signed by Total and MOGE on 9  July 1992 for 
operation of this gas field and the pipeline. In addition to the construction of offshore gas 
facilities by the partners, a separate company in which PTT-EP, MOGE, and other 
subsidiaries of Total and Unocal are investors (the Moattama Gas Transportation Company 
(MGTC)) built a 346-kilometer sub-sea pipeline to bring the gas to landfall in Myanmar, and 
a 63-kilometer onshore pipeline, with control and metering units, to carry the gas to the 
border with Thailand, which purchases most of the field's output under a long-term contract. 
Construction was carried out between the fall of 1995 and mid-1998, with gas production 
beginning in July 1998. Since its inception, this gas pipeline is working successfully. 
Yetagun gas pipeline 
The Yetagun natural gas field is located in the sea at the depth of 337 feet and about 125 
miles away from Myanmar coast.  It is estimated that the Yetagun natural oil and gas field 
has 1.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (PTT, 2007). Thailand imported about 1.16 billion 
cubic feet per day from the Yetagun gas field during 2007.
24
This second gas field was developed through PPP at a cost of about US$830 million, of 
which  US$325 million was for laying the pipeline, both onshore and offshore, between 
Yetagun, Myanmar and Ratchaburi, Thailand. Malaysia's Petronas
  
25
•  Petronas (operator): 40.9% 
 is the operator of the 
Yetagun gas field, along with Nippon Oil, PTT, Thailand, and Myanmar-owned MEPE, and 
the project has the following shareholdings:  
•  Nippon Oil, Japan: 24.8% 
•  PTT, Thailand: 19.3%  
•  MOGE, Myanmar: 15% 
The project is developed under a long-term contract and a 30-year power sales agreement 
(PA) was signed in March 1997 stipulating a daily contract quantity (DCQ) of 260 million 
ft
3/day of natural gas to be delivered to PTT, Thailand. Construction was carried out from 
1997 to 2000, and transmission started in 2001.   
The two crossborder gas pipelines developed under PPP have been providing enormous 
wealth to Myanmar. Gas has thus become a major export earner for Myanmar, accounting 
for over 30%  of its yearly export earnings (Thein and Myint 2008). Even then a large 
population of Myanmar does not have access to electricity. Setting up a domestic power 
plant from the crossborder gas export earnings would help Myanmar to strengthen rural 
electrification and industrialization. At the same time, Myanmar should open prospective 
hydropower projects to local and regional private sectors in order to achieve targeted 
objectives in the short term. In parallel, creation of a better investment climate and energy 
regulatory environment would be essential for proper energy sector development in 
Myanmar and regional cooperation. 
                                                 
23 A subsidiary of Unocal, further to its acquisition of Unocal in 2005. 
24 The Yetagun gas field was suspended supplying gas to Thailand on 2 April 2008 due to gas pipeline leakages. 
25 Petronas became involved in Yetagun through the acquisition of Texaco's 30% project interest in 1997. ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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6.  INVESTMENTS IN CROSSBORDER INFRASTRUCTURE: 
LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA  
With the launch of Mercosur  and Andean Community, South American countries have 
realized that intra-regional trade will not significantly mature until and unless they strengthen 
the region’s physical infrastructure, particularly the crossborder  infrastructure. In October 
2000, 12 South American countries launched an unprecedented multinational, multisectoral, 
and multidisciplinary initiative whose main objective is to develop the region’s 
infrastructure.
26
6.1.1  Integration and Development Hubs 
 Supported by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Corporation 
Addina de Fomento (CAF), and the Financial Fund for the Development of the River Plata 
Basin (FONPLATA), the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South 
America (IIRSA) pursues regional integration based on a hub strategy. It seeks to promote 
the development of transport, energy, and telecommunications infrastructure from a regional 
viewpoint, with the goal of the physical integration of the twelve South American countries 
and the achievement of an equitable and sustainable territorial development pattern. IIRSA 
has carried out joint work with the participating countries and multilateral institutions, 
focusing its efforts on three main areas: Building of a Strategic Vision for the Physical 
Integration of South America, Integration and Development Hubs, and Sectoral Integration 
Processes. 
Integration and Development Hubs, as outlined in IIRSA, are multinational territories 
involving natural spaces, human settlements, production areas, and current trade flow. 
South American countries have identified 10 initial hubs, namely, (i) Andean hub, (ii) South 
Andean hub, (iii) Capricon hub, (iv) Paraguay–Paraná Waterway Hub, (v) Amazon hub, (vi) 
Guianese Shield Hub, (vii) Southern hub, (viii) Central Interoceanic Hub, (ix) Mercosur–Chile 
Hub, and (x) Peru–Brazil–Bolivia Hub, for development of infrastructure and regional 
integration.  
Table 11: Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America 








  (US$ million)  (%) 
Mercosur–Chile Hub  91  19,464.80  28.51 
Peru–Brazil–Bolivia Hub  23  17,561.10  25.72 
Andean Hub  65  6,096.70  8.93 
Capricon Hub  63  6,083.00  8.91 
Guianese Shield Hub  32  5,847.20  8.56 
Central Interoceanic Hub  49  4,651.30  6.81 
Amazon hub  57  3,208.40  4.70 
Paraguay–Paraná Waterway Hub  98  2,828.80  4.14 
Southern Hub  26  2,529.80  3.71 
Others (PSI)  2  2.90  0.00 
Total  506  68,274.00  100.00 
Note: *Share in estimated investment  
Source: IIRSA (2007). 
                                                 
26 This initiative was adopted at a meeting of South American presidents held in Brasilia, Brazil, in August 2000 at 
which the region’s leaders agreed to take joint actions to promote South American political, social, and economic 
integration that includes the streamlining of regional infrastructure and specific measures to foster the integration 
and development of isolated subregions. ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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The rationale for IIRSA therefore goes beyond the need for infrastructure development. 
According to Moreira (2008), IIRSA is part of a broader case for South-South integration as a 
tool to promote higher productivity, equity, and growth. Infrastructure investments in IIRSA 
will create new opportunities for  sustainable development for the population of these 
territories. This crossborder development and planning of South American territory aims to 
facilitate access to areas with a high potential productivity, which are currently either isolated 
or underutilized due to the deficient provision of basic transport, energy,  or 
telecommunications services. 




Sources of Financing (US$ million) 
Government  Private  IDB*  CAF*  FONPL* 
Andean hub  2,617.40  1,599.20  944.70  23.00  50.50  0.00 
Capricon hub  1,643.60  812.40  12.00  540.00  144.20  135.00 
Amazon hub  1,884.30  1,313.60  410.70  160.00  0.00  0.00 
Guianese Shield Hub  657.40  390.90  0.00  120.50  96.00  0.00 
Southern hub  1,123.30  1,104.30  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Central Interoceanic Hub  3,077.20  2,379.80  114.30  77.00  506.10  0.00 
Mercosur–Chile Hub  8,647.40  5,398.00  2,371.00  539.00  199.30  10.00 
Peru– Brazil– Bolivia Hub  1,541.10  203.30  554.60  208.70  546.50  28.00 
Others (PSI)  2.90  1.00  0.00  1.90  0.00  0.00 
Total  21,194.60  13,202.50  4,407.30  1,670.10  1,542.60  173.00 
Share in Total 
Investment (%)    62.29  20.79  7.88  7.28  0.82 
PSI = private sector investment 
Note: Multilateral funding 
Source: IIRSA (2007). 
6.1.2  Project Portfolios 
The 12 countries involved in IIRSA have agreed to 506 priority infrastructure projects with an 
investment of US$68.27 billion, of which US$6.4 billion, comprising 31 projects, will be 
invested in 2010 (Table 11). The planning process was conducted from 2003 to 2006, and 
based on consensus, the Mercosur–Chile Hub and the Peru–Brazil–Bolivia Hub together will 
share half of the total estimated investment. Investments in remaining hubs have been less 
than 10%  of estimated total investment in IIRSA. Except for the Southern Andean hub, 
where the technical works have not yet been developed yet in the framework of IIRSA, the 
rest of the IIRSA hubs are covered in the first phase of this project. According to the IIRSA 
(2007), investment in crossborder transportation appears to be 55% (about US$38 billion), 
and the rest is shared by energy pipelines and telecommunications infrastructure.  
6.1.3  Sources of Financing and Implementation  
Implementation of 31 projects, falling under eight IIRSA hubs in South America, is also 
moving fast. As shown in Table 12, about US$21.19 billion has already been sourced during 
2003–2006 for financing these projects, including 14 that are being executed via PPP (IDB, 
2006).  
Table 12 also indicates that the majority of the infrastructure investments have come from 
governments of South America. They have agreed to invest about  US$13.20 billion 
(62.29%), followed by the  private sector (US$4.41 billion), sharing 20.79%  of total 
investment. The rest has been sourced from multilateral funding institutions like IDB 
(US$1.67 billion), CAF (US$1.54 billion), and FONPLATA (US$0.17  billion).  Proposed ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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private sector investment in South America is almost four times higher than that of Asia, 
where private sector investment in crossborder  infrastructure  via  PPPs  was about US$5 
billion during the last decade and a half.  
6.1.4  Public Private Partnerships in IIRSA 
IIRSA implies a long-term effort and therefore the countries have attached a high priority to 
the search for financial mechanisms and instruments suited for the purpose of developing 
IIRSA projects. In general, IIRSA has pursued three lines of action: the adoption of PPPs, 
the use of public investment in the budget (which is termed as fiscal margins or room), and 
design of financial instruments tailored to IIRSA’s need.  
The PPP has proved useful to all the participants of IIRSA (Carciofi 2008). Countries in 
IIRSA have been adopting a wide variety of approaches to private sector involvement. For 
example, Chile and Peru have had some experiences in PPPs, Brazil has passed novel 
legislation on PPP to support projects that could not otherwise be financed by its budget, 
and Argentina, which took a lead in PPPs in 1990s, has been experimenting with newer 
forms to encourage private sector participation in infrastructure projects. As the countries 
adopt PPP models for the development of their infrastructure, both public and private sectors 
gain better insights into this type of contract scheme. This broadened knowledge has in turn 
helped South American countries to pursue crossborder integration projects under IIRSA, 
which are more complex because of their crossborder implications.  
6.1.5  Lessons for Asia 
The experiences of Europe and Latin America, where the  presence of crossborder 
infrastructure is comparatively high, and to a lesser extent, Africa, where the development of 
crossborder infrastructure has taken a new shape, suggest that regional cooperation has 
been promoting greater prosperity and stability for participating countries. A major success 
determinant is their ability to build regional initiatives that are based on a shared strategic 
vision, as shown  in  the  Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South 
America (IIRSA) of Latin America (Carciofi 2008).
27
The IIRSA has been guided by two principles—open regionalism and PPP, which offer 
useful lessons for crossborder infrastructure development in Asia. Asia is considered a fully 
integrated geo-economic territory, in which it is necessary to minimize internal barriers to 
trade and bottlenecks in infrastructure as well as in the regulation and operation systems 
that support productive regional activities. While trade liberalization  facilitates the 
identification of highly competitive productive sectors at the global level, viewing Asia as a 
single economy also makes it possible to retain and distribute more benefits from trade in 
the region and to protect the regional economy from global market fluctuations. 
  
As regards PPPs, the region’s development challenges call for shared leadership and 
coordination between governments (at their different levels) and the private business sector, 
including the promotion of strategic PPPs for funding investment projects, and consultations 
and cooperation for developing an appropriate regulatory environment to ensure significant 
participation of the private sector in regional development and integration initiatives. This 
notion of shared leadership sets the basis for permanent dialogue between governments 
and businesspersons to support the planning and guiding function of the former, and 
facilitates project funding, execution, and operation responsibilities on behalf of the latter. 
                                                 
27 The Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) is a dialogue 
forum among the South American countries, which seeks to promote the development of transport, 
energy and telecommunications infrastructure from a regional viewpoint, aimed at physical integration 
of the 12 South American countries and the achievement of an equitable and sustainable territorial 
development pattern. About US$68.27 billion, comprising 508 infrastructure projects, having direct or 
indirect  crossborder  implications,  have been identified for investments across 12 Latin American 
countries, of which 12 projects are being executed under PPP. Source: IIRSA.  ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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The idea of development as a shared responsibility of governments and the business sector 
promotes the design of innovative funding, execution, and operation formulae for the so-
called “structuring” projects (those that  make other projects feasible), sharing risks and 
benefits and coordinating each party’s actions. 
7.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper has examined a range of crossborder infrastructure development issues related 
to the Asian countries. While tariff barriers have come down in Asia, international 
infrastructure along with “behind the border” issues have become important for deepening 
regional cooperation and integration. This suggests that there is significant potential for 
economic gains through deeper regional cooperation in Asia.  
Despite  the  active pursuit of private investment in infrastructure by most developing 
countries in Asia and a growing number of success stories, the pace of such investment 
remains slower than initially expected. Participation by the private sector in infrastructure 
development has been mixed. While there has been  moderate progress in national 
infrastructure development by the private sector, progress is rather limited in the case of 
development of crossborder infrastructure in Asia. The paper indicates that Asian countries 
have attracted higher private sector investment for development of national infrastructure 
projects like seaports and airports, compared to crossborder infrastructure projects in the 
past. The rising trend in private investors in infrastructure projects indicates a decline of 
investments by developed country investors.  
The paper has clearly brought out that private sector investment in crossborder  energy 
sector projects exceeds that found globally in the transport, telecommunications, or water 
sectors. In the Asian context and when all modes of financing crossborder  projects  are 
considered, energy sector projects still dominate the investment scenario. 
Crossborder  energy (power generation or natural gas) projects are driven by demand–
supply pressures within countries and the cost  economics associated with acquiring 
equivalent energy from other sources. In this sector, the commodity output, power or natural 
gas, is easily tradable and can be sold to power-deficient countries under long-term 
agreements, thereby providing opportunities to the host country to earn foreign exchange 
revenue and, as well, to  improve its economic condition. Risks associated with energy 
projects, like environment/social issues, political uncertainties, etc., are more or less limited 
to the pre-completion stage, and post-implementation risks are limited.  
On the other hand, crossborder  transport (road/highway) projects involve higher risks 
associated with traffic growth, willingness-to-pay, political equations, environmental and 
social issues, etc. Transport projects involve the physical cross-over of people and goods 
involving long, drawn-out formalities at border checkpoints. In a few cases, adverse political 
relations impact traffic,  and,  thereby,  revenue.  Crossborder  transport projects are also 
tagged with social problems, like drug/human trafficking, HIV/AIDS risks, etc.  
By considering all modes of financing, this paper has found that crossborder infrastructure 
financing in Asia has witnessed an upward trend in the last decade and a half. Given the 
huge infrastructure investment needs of the region and insufficient government resources, 
the role of the private sector and PPP in enhancing infrastructure facilities  in Asia, 
particularly crossborder infrastructure, is crucial.  
The review of the case studies of CBIPs clearly indicates that the major reasons for the slow 
progress of international infrastructure development by the  private sector are many, and 
comprise both economic and non-economic issues. Many of the new investments (such as 
transportation and energy) in crossborder infrastructure seem to be viable on commercial 
terms but non-workable when non-economic factors are considered. Also, preconditions for 
private financing of infrastructure (e.g., revenue-sharing, energy tariff fixation, etc.) are more ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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difficult to establish than is commonly realized. In addition, inadequate preparation leading to 
unanticipated problems and delays in implementing infrastructure projects is also seen as 
major drawbacks for limited response of private sector. While some projects have been 
operating successfully, some were stalled or abandoned, mainly due to political reasons 
(e.g., the  Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation 
Highway).  Indeed, public sector investment drives crossborder energy and transportation 
projects in Asia, whereas private sector investments have picked up the pace only recently, 
specifically after the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  
Trends in the GMS show that crossborder road transport projects have not yet attracted 
private investments upstream. Considering the complexities of the issues involved, and the 
fact that transport is a basic prerequisite for economic development, major parts of funding 
along with policy/program formulation and institutional reforms have of necessity been 
shouldered by national governments in the past, and the trend will have to continue in the 
future. The role of multilateral and bilateral development agencies is very important for 
facilitating dialogues between neighboring countries, evolving subregional plans, providing 
technical advice,  and financing and mobilizing resources for project implementation. The 
EWEC, and the entire GMS program as a whole, have demonstrated this effect 
(Butphomvihane 2007). 
Conventionally, the private sector is willing to participate in low-risk, high-return projects. 
However, crossborder projects are bundled with several risks: political, social, economic, etc. 
As a result, the private sector is hesitant to participate even in high-return projects. In such 
circumstances, the role of multilateral and bilateral development agencies in extending 
guarantees is very important. The Theun Hinboun and NT2 hydropower projects were able 
to attract private investment due to sustained support (comprising funding, covering political 
and risk guarantees,  and crucial support in implementing environmental and social 
rehabilitation and mitigation measures) from donor agencies like ADB, World Bank, and 
MIGA.  
Both environmental and social issues, including resettlement and rehabilitation of project- 
affected persons, need to be studied in sufficient detail and mitigation measures evolved 
during the project design stage itself in order to avoid problems during implementation and 
completion. An inclusive approach whereby the project-affected persons are equally and 
rightfully involved with evolving and implementing the mitigation plans works  well as 
observed in the NT2 project. 
Development of economic infrastructure comprising special industrial and economic zones 
requires  considerable investments, mainly from the private sector. However, basic 
infrastructure, in the form of roads, water, electricity, and telecommunications services are 
expected from the public sector. The SEZs along the EWEC have attracted some private 
industries and investments once the east-west road corridor became operational, providing 
much-needed connectivity to the Da Nang port on the Viet Nam side.  
Development of transport linkages has to be equally complemented with efficient operational 
procedures comprising crossborder transport agreements and elimination of non-physical 
impediments for the movement of goods and people. This includes simplified customs 
procedures, cooperation to reduce the need for inspection and quarantine measures, 
improve trade logistics, etc. ADB has played an important role in GMS through technical 
assistance to the neighboring countries in framing crossborder transport agreements and 
drafting the associated annexes and protocols. ADB has also been instrumental in capacity-
building activities (institutional and human resources development)  for enhancing the 
effectiveness of the program.  Private sector participation in financing and operating CBIPs 
in the transport sector is expected to facilitate and act as a catalyst in improving operational 
procedures across international borders (e.g., GMS crossborder transport agreements).  
Case study analysis also shows that the following prescriptions will better facilitate CBIPs 
which, despite their obvious advantages, still face a number of hurdles in Asia: ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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•  Standards and labels are widely acknowledged as an effective means to improve 
CBIP efficiency. Crossborder  connections,  be  they  energy or transport,  require 
harmonization of national legal and regulatory frameworks, as well as  pricing 
schedules. Common technical standards for design and construction, operation 
and maintenance, safety, etc. are also necessary.  
•  The need for active participation of the private sector in CBIPs in demonstrated by 
the example of gas distribution, which is currently controlled by a monopoly held by 
state-owned petroleum companies in many ASEAN countries, limiting private 
sector participation and investment. Countries in Asia should open up the entire 
downstream sector of CBIPs. Asian countries should  formulate  a competition 
policy across Asia to enhance investment efficiency for CBIPs.  
•  Individual governments must also move toward a market-based pricing system and 
away from practices, such as price intervention and tax distortions, that lead to 
inefficient pricing of CBIPs (e.g.,  natural gas and gas-related products and 
services).   
•  The emergence of the PRC  and India has significant implications for  regional 
patterns of CBIP usability. A detailed understanding of the CBIP dynamics is thus 
particularly valuable. 
7.1  Mechanisms to Strengthen CBIPs 
•  Greater spending on infrastructure to meet growth needs in Asia requires stronger 
partnership between government and private sector. Attracting both local and 
international private sector investment  requires clear regulatory frameworks, 
especially on key elements such as tariff regulation, maintaining a level playing 
field with incumbent public sector players, clear concession agreements  (for 
example, termination, change in law, force majeure, and competition policy) and 
competing facilities. 
•  Despite such  risk mitigation such as local currency financing, long-term  fixed 
interest rates, etc.,  active support and leadership from national governments in 
sharing project risks, extending tax benefits and facilitating matters related to land 
acquisition, environment, resettlement and rehabilitation, customs, etc. are 
essential  as  they  provide  much-needed confidence to the private sector in 
implementing CBIPs 
•  To foster new developers—both regional and south-south—the involvement and 
participation of multilateral donor agencies is important not only towards funding 
assistance but also in sharing project risks, providing technical assistance and 
guidance in environmental/social matters, etc. Donor agencies can play the role of 
an honest broker and help facilitate  dialogues on important matters related to 
CBIPs. 
•  Independent panels and review committees with participation from donor agencies 
and  the  active involvement  of project-affected persons in implementing 
social/environmental mitigation measures have been shown to be successful, as 
with the NT2 project.  
•  In order to gain support from the local population, a part of the revenue generated 
from the CBIPs  should  be  reinvested  for social and economic development 
activities around the project area.  
•  Transparent subsidies for essential services would attract  regional and 
international investors in CBIPs.  ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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•  Two far-reaching approaches towards CBIPs would be leveraging a demand-side 
approach  by creating bankable PPP projects, and leveraging a  supply-side 
approach by mobilizing more appropriate products and local currency financing for 
infrastructure. 
•  National governments and donor agencies will have to continue supporting 
development of basic infrastructure in bordering areas. The case study of EWEC 
reveals that once basic infrastructure is developed, the private sector is attracted 
and participates in investment projects in the long run. 
•  Considering the risk associated with CBIPs and depending on revenue accruals, 
project developers may have to consider revisiting or renegotiating the concession 
document so as to ensure sufficient and safe returns to private entrepreneurs. 
•  Implementation of operational components (e.g.,  trade  facilitation)  is  more 
complicated than the infrastructure project itself, and sufficient emphasis on 
technical support and capacity building from government agencies involved with 
border trade activities should be accorded in order to achieve the planned 
objectives.  
•  Innovative financing mechanisms to make the CBIPs more attractive for the private 
sector (like development rights for townships  for  the entrepreneur) need to be 
evolved.  
7.2  Way Forward 
Since Asia has a wide and vibrant base of local investors, and since limited public resources 
are not able to meet all of Asia’s required investments for crossborder infrastructure, Asian 
countries are exploring avenues for increasing investments in national and crossborder 
infrastructure through a combination of PPP and exclusive private investments. It is argued 
in the literature that PPP is one of the best-suited options for the development of national 
and international infrastructure.
28
Another perspective on infrastructure financing through PPP is that there are large financial 
market  implications  in the redirection of Asian savings from non-Asian money center 
financial markets to regional markets that can handle massive physical infrastructure 
investments (Summers 2006; Agarwala and De 2007; Krueger and Bhattacharya 2008). 
Therefore, this must be added to the very large ancillary investments that serve the new 
physical infrastructure: many of these will be private, but there will also be a significant public 
sector component as well as crossborder elements.  
 It supplements scarce public resources, creates a more 
competitive environment, and helps to improve efficiencies and reduce costs. In most cases, 
it also meets the specific financing requirements of stakeholders and beneficiaries.  
For many crossborder  infrastructure investments, PPP is emerging as the preferred 
instrument, where the private sector gets its normal financial rates of return while the public 
sector partner provides concessional funding based on the long-term direct and indirect 
benefits to the economy. There are also other options that are becoming popular in financing 
crossborder  infrastructure projects in Asia and elsewhere, such as equity financing for 
private infrastructure development, private bond placements, public bond placements, official 
aid financing, direct investment by national and Asian firms, foreign direct investment, and 
sovereign wealth fund. Various guarantees or subsidies are also used to share project risks. 
However, given the underdevelopment of the Asian financial markets outside a few key 
centers, financial infrastructure development is also needed to provide the appropriate type 
of investments for the full range of physical infrastructure projects. 
                                                 
28 See, for example, Kuroda et al. (2007), Nag (2007), to mention a few. ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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Governments in Asia along with multilateral development organizations can play a greater 
role for development of crossborder infrastructure in the region. This is not to deny that 
exclusive dependence on government for the provision of all infrastructure services 
introduces difficulties concerning adequate scale of investment, technical efficiency, proper 
enforcement of user charges, and competitive market structure. Nonetheless, complete 
reliance on private production, particularly without an appropriate regulatory environment in 
force, is also not likely to produce optimal outcomes.  Now, infrastructure investment is 
entering a new stage, marked by new operators and sources of capital, a redefining of the 
public sector’s role, and new instruments for regulating and overseeing public services. The 
role of private sector, whether through PPP, or PSP, is thus very important in order to 
sustain crossborder infrastructure development in Asia.  
Eliminating the gap in infrastructure financing for CBIPs is not all that is required. In order to 
attract large and medium-scale private investors, it is essential that Asian countries should 
set in place an effective and useful institutional mechanism to be operative at regional level. 
At the same time, countries have to continue domestic reforms which will encourage the 
private sector to invest in national infrastructure. A strong national infrastructure can only 
strengthen crossborder infrastructure since a large part of Asia is geographically contiguous. 
Contrary to popular belief, many Asian countries still do not have PPP policy, despite that 
fact that they are aggressively looking for private sector investment. Problems become more 
severe in smaller and LDCs where a lack of adequate capacity coupled with inadequate 
regulatory frameworks  jeopardizes  crossborder  infrastructure development opportunities. 
There should be a regional binding with specific targets to adopt an exclusive PPP policy 
and transparent guidelines for regional and national infrastructure. Here, Korea’s PPP policy 
and Latin America’s IIRSA initiative could provide some good lessons for Asia.  
At the same time, in order to unlock Asia’s crossborder infrastructure development potential, 
it is important to encourage effective coordination among development partners and donor 
agencies like ADB, JICA, ESCAP, IDB, World Bank, USAID, and other partners who are 
directly and indirectly engaged in regional cooperation and developmental activities.  
Finally, the need for a structured regional program for CBIPs is required not only to 
overcome the institutional constraints but also to finance and support crossborder projects 
among LDCs. Moreover, for many of these crossborder projects, there may be some gap in 
financial viability which the public sector may be invited to ease.
29
                                                 
29 Here, we have example of India’s Viability Gap Funding (VGF), which has been pursued for making an 
infrastructure project commercially viable. Pakistan has also introduced VGF in 2006. VGF or Grant means a 
grant one-time or deferred, provided under this Scheme with the objective of making a project commercially 
viable. See, Appendix 5, for further details.  
 The current trend among 
investors in crossborder  projects in Asia and South America shows  that public sector 
investments have been much higher than private sector, even though there is wide variation 
in investment between the two regions. Therefore, we can not ignore the role played by the 
government and multilateral development organizations in financing and developing 
crossborder  projects.  The need  is primarily of  three types: institutional support, capacity 
building, and long-term finance. To manage these three primary objectives, an exclusive 
program and a fund to promote crossborder infrastructure under the aegis of ADB would 
pave the way for facilitating private sector investors in Asia, as would leveraging existing 




ADB/ADBI Definition of a Regional Infrastructure Project 
A regional (also referred as crossborder or transnational) infrastructure project is defined as 
either an infrastructure project with activities spanning over more than one country  or a 
national infrastructure project that has significant crossborder impact (e.g., building a road in 
a country that connects a neighboring country.)   
Examples of national projects with crossborder impact include (i) international airports, (ii) 
national airports  with significant international flights and passengers, (iii) power projects 
(e.g.,  hydro) for exporting power to neighbors, (iv) international seaport,  and (v) roads 
connecting to seaport and airports.  
The following set of indicators could be defined that demonstrate the regional nature of a 
project. 
•  A regional infrastructure project is one in which project planning, bidding, or 
financing is done on a multicountry basis, indicating that it is a unified project 
affecting multiple states. [Define it as technically indivisible (section 1 (2A) of the 
Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)  guidelines). Note that multicountry 
bidding or financing is possible even for national projects.]  
•  Project implementation is done simultaneously in different countries/states, or with 
a specified sequencing in different countries. [Define it as action/construction on at 
least two sides of the border (section 1 (1) of the TEN-T guidelines).]  
•  Add a criteria based on section 1 (2B) of the TEN-T guidelines (joint commitment 
and common structure).   
•  Add a criteria based on section 2 of the TEN-T guidelines (agreement between 
member countries especially for the infrastructure that does not actually cross the 
border).   
•  Significant sales of goods or services output across regional borders can be 
considered a criterion. Twenty percent might be used. However, it is possible that if 
the good or service is critical in the recipient country, the project might be 
considered regional. For example, even though total crossborder usage might be 
limited, if a highly specialized hospital or medical facility in a neighboring country is 
critically important for other countries, there is a regional impact.  
Source: Biswa Bhattacharya, Special Advisor to Dean and ADB/ADBI Flagship Study 












1991  5.97  0.00 
1992  12.59  0.00 
1993  20.13  2.30 
1994  31.00  0.00 
1995  40.73  0.46 
1996  57.84  0.92 
1997  100.87  0.75 
1998  92.24  3.75 
1999  61.66  0.10 
2000  85.15  0.85 
2001  66.00  1.70 
2002  54.36  0.00 
2003  54.29  1.26 
2004  66.53  0.00 
2005  100.89  0.59 
2006  111.83  0.40 
Total  962.09  13.08 
PSI = private sector investment 
Source: Calculated based on World Bank PPI Database available at http://ppi.worldbank.org  
 
(b) Trends in Private Sector Investment in Infrastructure by Regions 
Year 
 
AP  ECA  LAC  MENA  SSA  Total 
(US$ million) 
1991  3,217  268  2,489  0  0  5,974 
1992  5,072  352  7,150  0  20  12,593 
1993  10,655  852  5,664  2,927  31  20,129 
1994  15,669  3,641  10,800  248  647  31,005 
1995  19,419  8,144  12,372  70  723  40,728 
1996  24,641  9,859  22,624  40  675  57,839 
1997  34,490  13,407  45,337  4,736  2,900  100,870 
1998  11,029  11,569  64,307  3,315  2,016  92,236 
1999  12,970  9,101  33,996  2,793  2,795  61,656 
2000  20,295  25,088  34,291  3,470  2,004  85,148 
2001  15,507  13,266  28,911  4,320  3,995  65,999 
2002  15,900  16,857  16,803  1,543  3,262  54,364 
2003  20,977  11,912  13,914  1,895  5,593  54,291 
2004  23,258  16,987  15,007  7,384  3,897  66,535 
2005  30,690  35,930  18,468  7,069  8,737  100,894 
2006  39,322  23,511  26,284  10,954  11,761  111,833 
Total  303,113  200,745  358,416  50,764  49,057  962,095 











Type of PPP 
 




East Asia and 
Pacific 
 
Electricity  1996  Greenfield project  BOT  2 
Natural Gas  1995  Greenfield project  BOO  1 
Natural Gas  1997  Greenfield project  BOO  1 
Europe and Central 
Asia  Natural Gas  2001  Greenfield project  BOO  1 







Electricity  1998  Greenfield project  Merchant  1 
Electricity  2000  Greenfield project  BOO  1 
Natural Gas  1996  Greenfield project  Merchant  1 
Natural Gas  1998  Greenfield project  BOT  1 
Natural Gas  1998  Greenfield project  Merchant  3 
Natural Gas  2000  Greenfield project  BOT  1 
Roads  1996  Greenfield project  BOT  1 
Middle East and 








Natural Gas  2003  Greenfield project  BOO  1 
Natural Gas  2005  Greenfield project  BOT  1 
Railroads  1995  Concession 
Rehabilitate, lease 
or rent, and transfer  1 
Railroads  2003  Concession 
Rehabilitate, 
operate, and 
transfer  1 
Railroads  2006  Concession 
Rehabilitate, 
operate, and 
transfer  1 
Roads  1997  Concession 
Build, rehabilitate, 
operate, and 
transfer  1 
PPP = Public-Private Partnerships  
Source: Calculated based on World Bank PPI database, available at http://ppi.worldbank.org  
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East Asia and 
Pacific  Energy 
Greenfield 
project  BOT  1996  535.5 
East Asia and 
Pacific  Energy 
Greenfield 
project  BOO  1995  394 
East Asia and 
Pacific  Energy 
Greenfield 
project  BOO  1997  325 
Europe and 
Central Asia  Energy 
Greenfield 
project  BOO  2001  1700 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean  Energy 
Greenfield 
project  BOT  1998  2200 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean  Energy 
Greenfield 
project  BOT  2000  170 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean  Energy 
Greenfield 
project  BOO  2000  680 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean  Energy 
Greenfield 
project  Merchant  1996  350 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean  Energy 
Greenfield 
project  Merchant  1998  1550 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean  Energy 
Greenfield 
project  Merchant  1999  100 
Middle East and 
North Africa  Energy 
Greenfield 
project  BOO  1993  2300 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  Energy 
Greenfield 
project  BOT  2005  590 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  Energy 
Greenfield 
project  BOO  2003  1200 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean  Transport 
Greenfield 
project  BOT  1996  32 
Sub-Saharan 




and transfer  1997  426 
Sub-Saharan 




transfer  1995  63.3 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  Transport  Concession 
Rehabilitate, 
operate, 
and transfer  2003  55.4 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  Transport  Concession 
Rehabilitate, 
operate, 
and transfer  2006  404 
PPI = Private Participation in Infrastructure  
Source: Calculated based on World Bank PPI database, available at http://ppi.worldbank.org ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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APPENDIX 4 
List of Private Sector Investors in Airports and Seaports in Asia  
Country  Year  Project 
Investment 









Airport  143.20 
Muhibbah 
Engineering  30.00  Cambodia  IFC 
Vinci  70.00  France   
2001–
2004 
Siem Reap International 
Airport (SRIA)  88.90 
Muhibbah 
Engineering  30.00  Cambodia  IFC 




Airport  200.00 
Muhibbah 
Engineering  30.00  Cambodia  IFC 
  Total  432.10  Vinci  70.00  France   
PRC 
1991–
1997  Shekou Container Terminal  82.80  P&O Ports  22.50  UK   
      Swire Pacific Ltd.  17.50 
Hong Kong, 
China   
1992–
1992  Nanhai Container Terminal  0.00 
Hutchison 
Whampoa Ltd  .. 
Hong Kong, 
China   
2002–
2005 
Xiamen New World Xiangyu 
Terminal  145.00 
NWS Holdings 
Limited  50.00 
Hong Kong, 
China   
1993–
1993 
Shanghai Container Terminals 
(SCT)  120.00 
Hutchison 
Whampoa Ltd  40.00 
Hong Kong, 
China   
1994–
1994 
Chiwan Kaifeng Container 
Terminal  14.20 
Chiwan Wharf 
Holdings  50.00  N/A   
1994–
1994 
Fuzhou International Airport - 
Phase I  270.00 
Daya Mitra 
Ekasejati  ..  Indonesia   
1994–
1994 
Fuzhou International Airport - 
Phase II  150.00  Hume Industries  ..  N/A   
1994–
1994 
Ningbo - Van Ommeren Tank 
Terminal  10.00         
1994–
1994  Shantou Zhuchi Port  90.00 
Hutchison 
Whampoa Ltd  .. 
Hong Kong, 
China   
1997–
1997  Zhuhai - Gaolan, Jiuzhou Ports  25.60 
Hutchison 
Whampoa Ltd  .. 
Hong Kong, 






1995  Lanshang port  0.00 
GATX Terminals 
Pte Ltd.  60.00  N/A   
1995–
1995  Xiamen Liquid Bulk Terminal  70.00 
Daxin Petroleum 
(the PRC)  20.00  N/A   
Paktank 
International B.V.  40.00  N/A   
1996–
1996 
Dalian Container Terminal 
(DCT)  480.00  PSA Corp  ..  Singapore   
1996–
1996 
Xiamen Airport Development 
Co. Ltd.  113.30  Others  ..  N/A   
1996–
1996  Xiamen Haicang Port  96.00 
Hutchison 
Whampoa Ltd  49.00 
Hong Kong, 
China   
1996–
1996 
Xiamen, Dongdu, Berths 
12,13,14  60.00 
Fairyoung 
(Xiamen) Port 
Investments Ltd  16.30  N/A  ADB, IFC 
NWS Holdings 
Limited  43.70 
Hong Kong, 
China   
1996–
1996 
Yantian International Container 
Terminals  477.80 
Hutchison 
Whampoa Ltd  73.00 
Hong Kong, 
China   
1997–
2005 
Changshu Xinghua Port Co. 
Ltd.  250.80 
Macquarie 
Infrastructure 
Group (MIG)  38.00  Australia   
Pan-United 
Corporation  51.30  Singapore   
1998–
1998  Dalian Marine Tank Terminal  30.00         
1998–
1998 
Fuzhou Daijiang Minjiang 
Terminals  0.00  PSA Corp  34.30  Singapore   
1998–
1998  Shanghai Hongqiao Airport  231.90  Others  ..  N/A   
1998–
1998  Shanghai Pudong Airport  225.00  Others  ..  N/A   
1998–
1998  Shenzhen Airport  75.20  Others  ..  N/A   
1998–
2005  Tianjin Port  272.00 
DP World  24.50  UAE   
NWS Holdings 
Limited  24.50 
Hong Kong, 







Wuhan Yangluo Container 
Port  24.00 
the PRC 
Infrastructure 
Group  56.10  the PRC  IFC 
1999–
1999  Funing Airport Project  12.05 
Suifenghe Bluesky 
Airport  ..  the PRC   
1999–




Cargo Terminal  57.90 
JHJ International 
Forwarding Co. 
Ltd.  20.00  the PRC   
      Lufthansa  29.00  Germany   
1999–
1999  Wuhan Airport  42.30 
NWS Holdings 
Limited  30.00 
Hong Kong, 
China   
1999–
1999 
Zhapu Port Multi-Purpose 
Terminal  61.00 
the PRC 
Infrastructure 
Group  33.00  the PRC  IFC 
2000–
2000  Beijing International Airport  386.00  Others  ..  N/A   
2000–
2003 
Qingdao Qianwan Container 
Terminal Co. Ltd.  1064.00 
AP Moller - 
Maersk Group  20.00  Denmark   
      P&O Ports  29.00  UK   
2000–
2000 
Shanghai Port Container Co. 




Terminal  100.00  PSA Corp  49.00  Singapore   
2001–
2001  Xiamen Airport Cargo Terminal  27.17  Others  49.00  N/A   
2002–
2002  Hainan Meilan Airport  97.90 
Copenhagen 
Airports  20.00  Denmark   
2002–
2005  Ningbo Beilun Port Phase II  391.55 
Hutchison 
Whampoa Ltd  49.00 
Hong Kong, 
China   
2002–
2002 
Shekou Container Terminals - 
Phase II  205.40  Others  9.80  N/A   
      P&O Ports  22.00  UK   
      Swire Pacific Ltd.  17.20 
Hong Kong, 







Yantian International Container 
Terminals Phase III  845.00 
Hutchison 
Whampoa Ltd  65.00 
Hong Kong, 
China   
2003–
2003 
Shanghai East Container 
Terminal  0.00 
AP Moller - 
Maersk Group  49.00  Denmark   
2003–
2003 
Shanghai Pudong International 
Container Terminals Ltd  338.16 
Hutchison 
Whampoa Ltd  30.00 
Hong Kong, 
China   
2004–








Servicios)  52.00  Spain  MIGA 
2004–
2004 
Xiamen Songyu Container 
Terminal  364.25 
AP Moller - 
Maersk Group  50.00  Denmark   
2004–
2006  Yangkou Port  54.00 
Paul Y.-ITC 
Construction 
Holdings  67.70  N/A   
2004–
2004 
Yantian Westport Container 
Terminal  12.30 
Hutchison 
Whampoa Ltd  41.60 
Hong Kong, 
China   
2005–
2005 
Deqing Wuxin Line Water 
Canal Operation Co. Ltd.  47.00  Isyoda Corp. Bhd.  70.00  Malaysia   
2005–
2005 
Phase II of Shanghai's 
Yangshan Mega-port Project  482.00 
AP Moller - 
Maersk Group  32.00  Denmark   
     
Hutchison 
Whampoa Ltd  32.00 
Hong Kong, 
China   
2005–
2005 
Shanghai Waigaoqiao Phase 
V Project  482.00 
Hutchison 
Whampoa Ltd  50.00 
Hong Kong, 
China   
2005–
2005 
Shenzhen Dachan Bay 
Container Terminals  858.00 
Modern Terminals 
Ltd.  65.00 
Hong Kong, 
China   
2005–
2005 
Tianjin Five Continents 
International Container 
Terminal Co. Ltd.  287.30 
NWS Holdings 






Zhuhai Gaolan Port New 
Container Terminals (Zhuhai 
International Container 
Terminal Phase II)  230.28 
Hutchison Port 
Holdings  50.00 
Hong Kong, 
China 






2006  Beilun Terminal Phase 4 Project  198.00  Italia Maritima Spa  50.00  Italy   
2006–




International Airport  713.43 
Airport Authority of 
Hong Kong, China  35.00 
Hong Kong, 
China   
2006–
2006  Huizhou Port  188.21 
Hutchison Port 
Holdings  33.60 
Hong Kong, 
China   
2006–
2006  Nansha Port Phase II  503.14 
AP Moller - Maersk 
Group  20.00  Denmark   
2006–
2006  Tianjin Port Development  139.74  Others  34.00  N/A   
2006–
2006 
Wenzhou Zhuangyuan Ao New 
World International Terminals  175.00 
NWS Holdings 
Limited  55.00 
Hong Kong, 
China   
2006–
2006  Zhuhai airport concession  45.17 
Airport Authority of 
Hong Kong, China  55.00 
Hong Kong, 
China   
  Total  12407.63         
Indonesia 
1995–
1995  Balikpapan Coal Terminal  50.00 
PT Dermaga 
Perkasa Pratama  ..     
1995–
1995  Pulau Laut  110.00 
Consolidated Bulk 
Handling  ..     
  Total    PT Swabara Bumi  ..     
     
PT Tritamas 
Majutama  ..     
1995–
1995 
Tanjung Priok Koja Container 
Terminal  111.10 
PT Humpuss 
Terminal 
Petikemas  N/A     
1999–
1999 
PT Jakarta International 
Container  555.00 
Hutchison 
Whampoa Ltd  51.00 
Hong Kong, 
China   
1999–
1999 
Tanjung Perak Container 
Terminal  473.00  P&O Ports  .. 
United 
Kingdom   
2003–
2003 
Terminal Petikemas Makassar 




(ICTSI)  95.00  Philippines   




Lao PDR  2000  Vientiane Airport Terminal    JAL Trading  24.50  Japan   
2000  Vientiane Airport Terminal    Tomen Corp.  24.50  Japan   
Malaysia 
1992–
1997  Klang North Port  215.60  Northport Corp. Bhd.    N/A   
1997–
2001  Lumut Port  126.40  Integrax  80.00  N/A   




Crossing (Second Crossing 
Bridge; Second Crossing 
Expressway; Perling 
Expressway)  111.00 
United Engineers 
(Malaysia) Berhad  ..  Malaysia   
1994–
1994  Klang Westport  540.00  Hutchison Whampoa Ltd  .. 
Hong Kong, 
China   
     
Pembinaan Redzai Sdn 
Bhd  ..  N/A   
1995–
1995  Johor Port  0.00  MMC Corporation Bhd.  51.70  Malaysia   
1995–
1995  Tanjung Pelepas Port  736.00 
AP Moller - Maersk 
Group  ..  Denmark   
     
Seaport Terminal 
(Johore) Sdn Bhd  ..  N/A   
1997–
1997  Kerteh Liquid Bulk Terminal  107.00  Dialog MCV Sdn Bhd  ..  N/A   
      GATX Terminals Pte Ltd.  ..  N/A   
1997–
1997  Kuantan Port  214.00 
Road Builder (M) 
Holdings Sdn Bhd  100.00  N/A   
1999–
1999  Malaysia Airports Holdings Bhd.  130.00  Others  ..  N/A   
2003–
2003  Senai International Airport  281.00 
Senai Airport Terminal 
Services Sdn Bhd  100.00  N/A   
2004–
2004  Sabah Ports Sdn Bhd  342.11 
Suria Capital Holdings 
Bhd  100.00  Malaysia   
2006–
2006 
Kemaman Port East Wharf 
Privatization  13.00 
Eastern Pacific Industrial 
Corp Bhd  61.00  Malaysia   
  Total  2816.11 
Road Builder (M) 




1996  Thilawa Container Terminal  50.00  Hutchison Whampoa Ltd  80.00 
Hong Kong, 
China, the 
PRC   
Philippines 
1997–
1997  Manila South Harbour  471.70 
All Asia Capital & Trust 
Corp.  ..  Philippines   
      Mitsui  ..  Japan   
      P&O Ports  .. 
United 
Kingdom   
  Manila North Harbour   
International Container 
Terminal Services Inc. 
(ICTSI)  ..  Philippines   
1999–
1999  Bauan Terminal  78.30 
Bauan International Port, 
Inc. (BIPI)  40.00  Philippines   
     
International Container 
Terminal Services Inc. 
(ICTSI)  60.00  Philippines   
2000–
2000  Subic Bay Terminal  4.90 
International Container 
Terminal Services Inc. 
(ICTSI)  ..  Philippines   
     
Royal Ports Services 
Inc.  ..  Germany   
2001–
2001  Subic Bay Grain Terminal  10.60 
Mega Equipment 
International Corp.  100.00  Philippines   
2002–
2002  Eva Macapagal Super Terminal  30.10  Asian Terminal, Inc.  100.00  Philippines   
  Total  595.60         
Thailand 
1990–
1990  Laem Chabang Terminal B 3  0.00  Kamigumi Co.  ..  Thailand   
      Marubeni Corp.  ..  Japan   
1990–
1990  Laem Chabang Terminal B 4  0.00  Mitsui  ..  Japan   
      Ngow Hock Group  ..  N/A   
      NYK Line  ..  Japan   
1991–






1992  Map Ta Phut  48.00 
Paktank 
International B.V.  49.00  N/A   
1993–
1993  Laem Chabang Terminal A4  0.00 
Aawthai 
Warehouses Co.   ..  Thailand   
1993–
1993  Laem Chabang Terminal B 2  0.00 
Evergreen Marine 
Corp  ..  Taipei,China   
      Green Siam Co.  ..  Thailand   
1995–
1995  Laem Chabang Terminal B 1  0.00 
Laem Chabang 
International 
Terminal Co. Ltd.  ..  Thailand   
1996–
1999  Laem Chabang Terminal B 5  32.00 
Laem Chabang 
International 
Terminal Co. Ltd.  ..  Thailand   
1998–
1998  Laem Chabang Terminal A5  27.40 
Banpu Public 
Company  100.00  Thailand   
1999–
1999  Laem chabang Terminal A2  31.73 
Ban Saen 
Mahanakorn Ltd.  ..  Thailand   
     
Hutchison 
Whampoa Ltd  88.00 
Hong Kong, 
China   
2001–
2001  Laem Chabang Terminal A1  15.00  Star Cruises  100.00  Malaysia   
2003–
2003  Laem Chabang Terminal C3  45.00  P&O Ports  ..  UK   
2004–
2004  Airports of Thailand  439.00  Others  30.00  N/A   






1997  Phu My Port  30.00  Norsk Hydro    Norway  IFC 




(SCPA)    N/A   
1996–
1996 
Ho Chi Minh City Airport Cargo 
Services  15.00 
Singapore Airport 
Terminal     Singapore   
1997–
2002  Tan Thuan Dong container port  70.00  Mitsui    Japan   
     
Neptune Orient 
Lines    Japan   




Jamuna Bridge - First 
management contract    Abdul Monem  ..  Bangladesh  ADB 
      Group Five  75.00  South Africa  IBRD 
      Owen Williams   ..  UK   
2004–
2004  Jamuna Bridge    Net One Ltd  ..  Bangladesh   
      PT Jasa Marga  ..  Indonesia   
2005–
2005 
Shah Amanat (Chittagong) 
International Airport   
Thai Airways 
International Public 
Company Limited  100.00  Thailand   
India 
1994–
1994  Cochin International Airport  125.00  Others  ..  N/A   
1997–
1997  Pipavav Port  178.30  PSA Corp  22.50  Singapore   
     
Seaking Engineers 
Ltd.  37.00  N/A   
1996–
2006  Mundra Port  439.07  Adani Group  51.00  India   
1997–
1997 
Nhava Sheva International 
Container Terminal  200.00  DP World  49.00  UAE   
     
Konsortium 






1998  Tuticorin Container Terminal  127.00  PSA Corp  57.50  Singapore   
     
South India 
Corporation  37.50  India   
1999–
1999  Dahej Liquid Chemical Port  203.10 
Indian 
Petrochemical 
Corporation Limited  30.00  India   
1999–
1999  Navlakhi port  2.00  United Shippers  100.00  India   
1999–
1999  Kakinada Port  72.00 
Larsen & Toubro 
Limited  ..  India   
     
Precious Shipping 
Ltd.  ..  Thailand   
     
Stevedoring 
Services of 
America (SSA) Inc.  33.00 
United 
States   
2001–
2001 
Chennai Container Terminal Pvt 
Ltd  100.00  Chettinad Group  20.00  India   
      DP World  75.00  UAE   
2001–
2001 
Mundra International Container 






Terminal  62.40  DP World  50.00 
UAE 
 
     
United Liner 
Agencies  50.00  India   
2003–
2003 
Haldia Dock Complex (4A 
Berth)  23.00  ISP Singapore  67.00  Singapore   
      S.S. Global  33.00  UAE   
2003–
2003  Mormugao Port  20.60 
ABG Heavy 
Industries Ltd.  100.00  India   
2004–
2004 
Gateway Terminals India 
Private Limited (GTI)  220.65 
AP Moller - Maersk 
Group  74.00  Denmark   
2005–
2005 
Bangalore International Airport 
Limited  324.20 
Larsen & Toubro 
Limited  17.00  India   
      Siemens AG  40.00  Germany   
     
Unique (Flughafen 






2005  Gangavaram Port Limited  385.50  DP World  ..  UAE   
      DVS Raju  ..  India   
2005–
2005 
GMR Hyderabad International 
Airport Limited  399.10  GMR Group  63.00  India   
2005–
2005 
Rajiv Gandhi Container 
Terminal  0.00  DP World  75.00  UAE   
2006–
2006 
ABG Kandla Container Terminal 
Limited  45.50 
ABG Heavy 
Industries Ltd.  100.00  India   
2006–
2006 
Chhatrapati Shivaji International 
Airport  1,313.00  Bidvest Group  27.00  South Africa   
      GVK Group  37.00  India   
2006–
2006 
Indira Gandhi International 
Airport  1225.00  GMR Group  50.10  India   
2006–
2006  Karaikal Port  92.00 
Marg Constructions 
Limited  100.00  India   
2006–
2006 
Krishnapatnam Port Company 
Limited  143.50 
Natco Pharma 
Limited  26.00  India   





Terminal - Phase I  200.00  DP World  75.00  UAE   







Pakistan International Container 
Terminal  144.00 
Premier Mercantile 
Services Ltd.  41.00  Pakistan  IFC 
1995–
1995 
Port Mohammed bin Qasim 
Liquid Bulk Terminal  65.00 
Engro Chemical 
Pakistan Ltd.  50.00  N/A   
     
Paktank 
International B.V.  50.00  N/A   
1995–
1995 
Qasim International Container 
Terminal  134.60 
AP Moller - Maersk 
Group  20.00  Denmark   
      DP World  55.00  UAE   
1997–
2003 
Karachi - International Container 
Terminal  148.70 
American President 
Lines    N/A  IFC 




(ICTSI)    Philippines   
2006–
2006 
Second Container Terminal at 
Port Mohammad Qasim  211.00  DP World  100.00  UAE   
2006–
2006  Sialkot International Airport  40.00  Others  100.00  N/A   
  Total  743.30         
Sri Lanka 
1999  Colombo Port (SAGT)  240.00  DP World  26.20  UAE  ADB 
     
John Keels 
Holdings Ltd.  33.70  Sri Lanka  IFC 
Source: World Bank PPI database, available at http://ppi.worldbank.org 
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APPENDIX 5: VIABILITY GAP FUNDING IN 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN INDIA 
An investment of about US$500 billion would be required in the infrastructure sector during 
the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007–2011). These investments are to be achieved through a 
combination of public investment, public-private-partnerships (PPPs), and exclusive private 
investments, wherever feasible. Viability Gap Funding (VGF) or Grant means a grant, one-
time or deferred, provided under this Scheme with the objective of making a project 
commercially viable. The total VGF under the PPP scheme of the Government of India shall 
not exceed 20% of the total project cost; provided that the Government or statutory entity 
that owns the project may, if it so decides, provide additional grants out of its budget, but not 
exceeding a further 20% of the total project cost. The VGF is normally in the form of a capital 
grant at the stage of project construction. Proposals for any other form of assistance may be 
considered by the Empowered Committee and sanctioned with the approval of Finance 
Minister on a case-by-case basis. The VGF up to Rs1 billion (about US$25 million) for each 
project is sanctioned by the Empowered Institution (here  through IIFC), subject to the 
budgetary ceilings indicated by the Finance Ministry. The Empowered Committee is also 
entitled to sanction VGF up to Rs2 billion, depending upon the project feasibility, and 
amounts exceeding Rs2 billion may be sanctioned by the Empowered Committee with the 
approval of Finance Minister. 




(i) India–Myanmar– Thailand Trilateral Highway 
India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway (IMTTH) is a crossborder  transportation 
network being financed by the governments of India, Myanmar,  and Thailand, and 
developed by the pubic sector. This highway links Moreh (in India) with Mae Sot (in 
Thailand) through Bagan (in Myanmar), which is often termed a land bridge between South 
and Southeast Asia. The alignment of this trilateral highway falls within the Asian Highways 
1 and 2, being pursued by ESCAP (De 2005).  
The IMTTH is divided into three phases; the first phase includes 78 km of new roads, 
upgrading  of about 400 km of roads, construction of all-weather approach lanes, 
rehabilitation/ reconstruction of weak or distressed bridges and a detailed examination of a 
project on the Ayeyarwaddy river as well as a causeway. The entire project is being funded 
through government resources. Phase-I of the IMTTH was taken up in early 2005. India 
assumes responsibility of 78 km of missing links and 58 km of upgrading as part of Phase-I. 
India may also take up additional 132 km of upgrading. Thailand would take up upgrading of 
136 km and 62 km sectors of Phase-I and another 100 km as part of Phase-II. Myanmar has 
indicated willingness to take up intermediary approach roads  and  reconstruction/ 
rehabilitation of weak bridges.  
India has agreed to offer credit at concessional terms to Myanmar for financing new 
constructions of Chaungma–Yinmabin (30 km) and Lingadaw–Letsegan–Pakokku (48 km.) 
highways. India has also agreed to consider similar financing for improvement to two–lane 
standard of the Yinmabin–Pale–Lingadaw (50 km) road section inside Myanmar. Further, 
India has agreed to consider financing of the improvement of the Bagan–Meiktila (132 km.) 
segment in Myanmar. India has also agreed to undertake the preparation of a Detailed 
Project Report (DPR) for construction of a bridge on the Ayeyarwaddy river and for the 
causeways near Kyadet. Thailand has agreed to extend concessional loans for financing the 
improvement to two-lane standard of the Thaton–Hpa–an–Kawkareik section (136 km) and 
Kawkareik–Myawaddy section (62 km). These sections are part of the western side of the 
East-West Economic Corridor in GMS between Myanmar and Thailand. Thailand has also 
agreed to assist Myanmar in financing of the route Thaton–Mawlamyine–Mudon–Kawkareik 
as a second phase of the project. Myanmar has agreed to finance construction of all-weather 
intermediate lane approach roads at both ends from Pakokku to Bagan up to the existing 
ferry crossing and the rehabilitation/reconstruction of distressed and weak bridges. Myanmar 
has decided to explore the possibility of important commercial segments of the highway 
being constructed, operated, and maintained by operators on a commercial basis.  
The Indian government–owned Border Roads Organisation (BRO) had upgraded the Tamu–
Kalewa–Kalemyo (TKK) road (160 km) in Myanmar from the Indian northeastern border at a 
cost of Rs. 1.20 billion (about US$27.28 million). The  Government of India is also 
responsible for upkeep of the TKK road in Myanmar. However, the work has been stalled 
since 2006, due mainly to political reasons. Lack of essential institutional support and 
government commitments are some of the reasons for slowing down the development of this 
trilateral highway. It has been argued that deeper regional cooperation among the three 
countries (perhaps within BIMSTEC) would help restart the development of the trilateral 
highway.  
(ii) Indonesia–Malaysia Gas Pipeline 
The Indonesia–Malaysia gas pipeline runs from West Natuna, an offshore reserve in the 
South the PRC Sea, to Duyong, Malaysia. In August 2002, Indonesia began delivering 250 
Mmcf/d of piped natural gas to Malaysia’s Duyong platform. This crossborder pipeline was ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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developed at an investment of US$22 million through PPP and has been working 
successfully.  
(iii) Malaysia–Thailand Gas Pipeline 
The origin of the project dates back to 1979, when the governments of Thailand and 
Malaysia signed a memorandum agreeing to explore the possibilities of jointly developing 
the gas reserves in the Joint Development Area (JDA) in Gulf of Thailand. Malaysia has one 
of the most extensive natural gas pipeline networks in Asia, owing to the multiphased 
Peninsular Gas Utilization (PGU) project that was completed in 1998. The goal of the PGU 
was to expand natural gas transmission infrastructure in Peninsular Malaysia.  
The Malaysia–Thailand Gas Pipeline (Trans–Thailand–Malaysia Pipeline) is an ongoing joint 
project between Petronas, Malaysia and Petroleum Authority of Thailand. Both the 
companies have set up a Special Purpose Vehicle, namely, Trans–Thai-Malaysia Ltd (TTM), 
which is the developer of the Thai-Malaysia Gas Pipeline project. The 374 km gas pipeline 
project comprises a 277 km offshore section and 97 km onshore section. The pipeline will 
transport gas from the Malaysian–Thai Joint Development Area (JDA) to the Peninsular Gas 
Utilization pipeline at Changlun in Kedah, Malaysia. This linkage will mark a major step 
towards realizing the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP). Despite several social and 
political problems, construction of the pipeline started in 2003 and was completed in 2007. 
Malaysia–Thailand Joint Development Area 
The JDA is an overlapping economic zone located offshore between Malaysia and Thailand 
in the Gulf of Thailand. The Joint Development Area was established to resolve the 
overlapping claims between Malaysia and Thailand over the hydrocarbon resources in the 
area. The area is divided into three blocks, namely, Block A-18, Block B-17 and Block C-19, 
and is administered by the Malaysian-Thailand Joint Authority (MTJA), of which Malaysia 
and Thailand each owns 50%.  
Through MTJA, both countries agreed to adopt Malaysia's model of the production sharing 
contract (PSC). The production sharing contractors for Block A-18 are Petronas Carigali 
(JDA) Sdn Bhd, a wholly owned subsidiary of Petronas Carigali, and Triton Oil Company of 
Thailand; while the contractors for the other two blocks, Block B-17 and Block C-19, are 
Petronas Carigali (JDA) Sdn Bhd and Carigali-PTTEP International Operating Company 
(CPOC).  
Petronas and Petroleum Authority of Thailand have concluded the gas sales and purchase 
agreement for Block A-18. Under the agreement, Petronas and Petroleum Authority of 
Thailand will buy gas from the Joint Development Area on a 50:50 basis and then bring their 
respective share of gas back to Malaysia and Thailand. Gas purchases from Block A-18 are 
expected to amount to 390 million standard cubic feet per day. 
This Thailand–Malaysia gas pipeline is one of the seven gas pipeline interconnections 
identified to be developed under the TAGP project of ASEAN. It is expected to link all the 10-
member countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations by the end of the decade. 
(iv) Malaysia–Singapore Gas Pipeline 
Malaysia and Singapore have two gas pipelines in operation (Figure 10)—one was set up in 
1991, the oldest in ASEAN, and the other in 2006. The first pipeline, developed through PPP 
at a cost of US$260 million, delivers about 150 million standard cubic feet per day (scf/d) 
from Malaysia to Singapore, whereas a second pipeline of about 6 km. long was set up 
through PPP at a cost of US$17 million in 2006.  
Singapore's Senoko Power currently imports 155 million cubic feet per day (Mmcf/d) of 
natural gas through the first pipeline from Petronas, Malaysia. The Senoko-Petronas deal 
expired in mid-2008. In June 2005, Singapore’s Keppel Energy reached an agreement to ADBI Working Paper 245    De, Samudram, and Moholkar 
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purchase 115 Mmcf/d of natural gas over 18 years from Petronas. To transport the natural 
gas, Keppel and Petronas have completed a 3-mile pipeline between Plentong in the 
southern Malaysian state of Johor to the Senoko area in the north of Singapore, which is 
called as Malaysia–Singapore second gas pipeline. However, the Plentong pipeline will have 
a capacity to transport up to 290 million ft
3/day  of natural gas, which could provide for 
increased sales of natural gas to Singapore in the future.  
(v) Houay Ho Hydropower, Lao PDR 
Houay Ho (HH) hydropower project was set up  at an investment of US$220 million to 
develop a 150 MW hydroelectric power plant on the Houay Ho river in Lao PDR under BOT 
agreement with the Lao PDR Government to generate and export electricity to Thailand.  
Houay Ho Power Company (HHPC) is an independent power producer (IPP) established in 
1996 to operate this project. The project was originally funded and undertaken by Daewoo 
Engineering/Construction Company of Korea as an EPC Contractor in 1993, following a 30-
year BOT Agreement with the Government of Lao PDR to exploit hydroelectric resources in 
Lao PDR. The project was later transferred to SUEZ Energy International and Houay Ho 
Thai Company Limited in 2002. With this acquisition, SUEZ Energy International has 
become one of major players in electric power industry sector in Lao PDR. The current 
investors are as follows: 
•  SUEZ Energy International, France: 60%,  
•  EDL, Lao PDR: 20%  
•  HHTC, Lao PDR: 20%.  
Both BOT and Power Purchase Agreement became effective from 1999 for a period of 30 
years. The plant was commissioned successfully in September 1999, and has served the 
PPA with EGAT, Thailand faultlessly ever since. The HH project has provided employment 
opportunities to the local people, besides providing taxes, royalties and export earnings to 
Lao PDR government. According to HHPC, during construction, it has provided 325 jobs for 
Lao citizens, most of them taken by local people (Ban Nam Han village and immediate 
surroundings), of which 84 jobs for Lao citizens were permanent in nature (available 
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